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Foreword 
President Kennedy has expressed the determination 
of the United States to "keep disarmament high on our 
agenda-to make an intensified effort to develop ac-
ceptable political and technical alternatives to the pres-
ent arms race," and, as a significant step in that direc-
tion, to achieve an effective nuclear test ban treaty at 
an early date. 
This pamphlet describes the most recent efforts of 
this Government to bring those policies to successful 
fruition, as reflected in statements and addresses by 
some of the principal U.S. officials charged with their 
execution. 
The serious student of the problems of disarmament 
and a nuclear test ban treaty should find this document 
a source of essential information as to specific aspects 
of negotiation, the basis of U.S. policy, and the philos-
ophy underlying American proposals in this field. 
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The Call for Leadership 
BY JOHN J. McCLOY 
IT is a great, if exacting, honor to be asked to deliver the keynote 
talk to such an assembly of industrial leaders as we have here 
today. You have come from many areas of the globe and you 
represent, I should say, as distinguished a group of business 
thinkers as it is possible to gather together at anyone place and 
at anyone time. It is a hopeful sign that in these momentous, 
and perhaps perilous, times a nongovernmental group such as 
this is prepared to come together and exchange thoughts during 
the days of conference. 
The pamphlet guide for this conference states that I am expected 
to review the major economic business and industrial problems 
which confront the world and stress what business leadership 
should do about them. This gives one a most generous leeway, 
to say the least; yet somehow I do not feel, broad as it is, that it 
is a fitting subject for me to talk about here today considering the 
condition of the world which now faces all of us. Certainly a 
mere discussion of standard concepts and conventional approaches 
to the solution of business problems is hardly the proper .order of 
the day with the renewed rumbling of nuclear explosions in our 
ears and the steady increase of the ominous events which crowd 
the headlines. I dare say that there is no one among you, whether 
he be a native of or a visitor to this country, who is not deeply 
preoccupied with the serious international situation which we have 
seen developing during the last few months. 
Dealing with something which is so much more political than 
industrial probably cannot properly be called keynoting this meet-
ing, but I suppose it is difficult to list anything more important 
to industry the world over than the political conditions under 
which it operates. At any rate, I have determined in place of my 
assigned subject to speak of things related more to the political 
than to the industrial conditions we now face in this world. 
It seems inconceivable, but it is a fact that we today find our-
1 
selves again face to face with threats of another war-a bare 16 
years after the close of the last one. IIowever high our hopes and 
firm our determination to do all possible to avoid it, we cannot 
blink the fact that the situation is serious. 
What is the nlalady that so plagues human society that we have 
so frequently to face the threat of war? In my lifetim'e I have 
taken part in two world ,,"aI'S, in each of which, at least so far as 
the United States and those who fought with the United States 
were concerned, the result ,,"as a total victory. In each case we 
felt, as 'we endured the struggle, that if ,ye could but a.chieve the 
victory, the future would be nlade secure from further war. After 
each, there was a universal determination to establish the means 
by which 'wars could be avoided. Serious efforts were made to 
erect institutions and to bring about a condition where resort to 
force or threats of force in the settlenlent of international dis-
putes would be outlawed. How dislnally we have failed! 
'Vhat is "Tong with the world's thinking and its statesmanship? 
In all conscience the "ea pons of the last war were horrible 'enough 
in their devastating effects to ilnpel men to abjure their use again, 
but when compared to those we now know how to e.mploy, they 
might almost be termed primitive. Ilow ca.n the lnunan race keep 
doing this to itself? There are probably a nlunber anlong you who 
think they can foresee the consequences of a thermonuclear war, 
but I doubt that there is anyone in this auclience who truly can 
give any dependable appraisal of ,,-hat the total effect of such a 
war woulcl be upon mankind. The combination of blast, conflagra-
tion, fallout, and the disruption of the services by which human 
beings have come to live is so incalculable that I doubt if any finite 
mind can grasp either the fact or the inlport of such "an event; 
and yet we do not have the reliable substitute for such a futile 
and suicidal means of settling our disputes. The question con-
fronting us is what is to be done about it, and there is a griln 
urgency pressing for the solution. 
""\tVe may slide by the olninous Berlin a.nd German problems by 
a means not yet too clear, but what about the next crisis, for these 
things have a dangerous habit of following one another. It is 
not reasonable to expect that ,ye can indefinitely nlove from one 
crisis to another, always averting disaster only throngh the deter-
rence involved in a nice balance of terror. 
On the last day of 1960 I retired frOln the chairmanship of a 
bank with the thought that the tilne had come in my life where 
others could well take up nly duties of administration and I could 
devote myself to the performance of those tasks 'which I most 
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wanted to do. I was not seeking a pasture by any rneans, but I 
did labor under the illusion that I could devote a little more time 
than before to reading, good companionship, hunting, fishing, and 
a more normal fanlily life and so on. You know that refrain-it 
takes the form of hearing yourself say that you ,vill only choose 
the law cases and only deal with the problems which are interest-
ing and appealing to you and which yonI' now ripened judgment 
will enable you to dispose of with a certain dignified but moderate 
effort. And then with no ,,~anling I ,vas asked to become an 
... \.dviser to the President on matters of disarmament in a period 
,vhen the ,vhole prospect of disarmament, international under-
standing, and confidence in a divided world was at a very low ebb. 
A good part of my previous Government experience had been with 
armaments-preparing the country for ,var or helping maintain 
the country in war as had been the experience of many of those 
I see before me today. I had a rather clear insight into "That ,vars 
and Inodern weapons, including atomic weapons, could achieve, 
and it required little argument to convince me how' profoundly 
necessary it was for mankind to seek the means of ridding itself 
of this scourge if we were to hold forth to those who take our 
places in this world the prospect of living their lives in decency 
and peace. 
The Complexities of Disarmament 
For over 8 nlonths now I have been stnlggling with this matter 
of disannament, and I am prepared to say that I have never faced 
as complicated, as difficult, or as challenging a problem in or out of 
business, in or out of war, in or out of the law as this one. It 
involves or could involve every aspect of our national life-for-
eign policy, defense policy, economic policy-indeed, our 'v hole 
social structure. I USe the term "disarmament," of course, in its 
widest sense to include the reduction or eliInination of arms, the 
control of arms, and the maintenance and improvement of our 
peacekeeping machinery. 
The President asked me to advise him not only in regard to 
policy in respect of disarmament but also to make recommenda-
tions as to the form of organization within the Government which 
should be set up in order to deal with this mighty issue. This 
I have attempted to do, and the bills no,v before the Congress 
to set up a statutory agency to deal ,vith this question are the 
result of the President's acceptance of these recommendations. 
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And if one may ask why the President is requesting the Congress 
of the United States to set up such an agency at the same time 
we are building up our strength in the face of threats of ,var, 
I believe the answer is that it is now of all times that we should 
examine seriously this matter of disarmament to see if it can 
advance us toward the achievement of a peaceful world. 
Disarmament and its attendant problems have been with us 
in one form or another ever since the close of the war-every 
United Nations meeting deals with them, and in the coming ses-
sions of the United Nations the issue will again crowd the docket 
and there will probably be a large number of resolutions put 
forward about it induced by a wide crosscurrent of motives. We 
have .had international negotiations going on, sometimes two or 
three at a time, dealing with the subject, and we have used a 
variety of means and methods to make progress with it. Some, 
I.am forced to say, were devised on too short notice and with too 
little preparation to cope with the seriousness of the problem and 
its manifold complexities. 
Geneva Test Ban Negotiations 
The first problem with which the new United States adminis-
tration had to deal was the test ban negotiations at Geneva. It 
took the most intensive effort to work out a definite and practi-
cable position, clear it with the many agencies of Government 
which had a deep and lively interest in the subject, do the same 
then with our allies and associates who with us share responsibili-
ties for the security of the free world. By dint of much scientific 
analysis, careful consideration of many security problems, we 
were, in good time, able to put forward a proposed treaty for a 
test ban which I felt that any nation seriously determined to 
find a means for banning future nuclear tests could readily accept. 
It was made possible by the convocation of scientists and the 
experts knowledgeable in this field, and I do believe' that no obj ec-
tive individual or group with an awareness of the factors 
involved can escape the conclusion that the United States made 
every reasonable effort, including the granting of solid conces-
sions, some of them involving real risks, in the hope of achieving 
agreement. I think our position at Geneva amply demonstrated 
our willingness and determination to effect an agreement that all 
could live with. It is futile to recount the weary and frustrating 
course of those negotiations at Geneva. President I(ennedy, the 
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Secretary of State, Arthur Dean, and all of us held the highest 
hopes for a prompt conclusion of an agreement which might well 
have been the significant forerunner of further agreements 
which could have led both to the relief of some of the burdens 
of the arms race and to the significant lessening of tensions. 
I repeat, I do not see how the President of the United States 
could have clung more tenaciously than he did not only to the 
. hope of concluding an agreement but of adjusting his position 
to meet any reasonable demands of the Soviet Union. 
It now transpires that from the very beginning of the talks 
the Soviets had no interest in concluding a treaty ban. And the 
nature, speed, and number of the recent Soviet nuclear explosions 
make it abundantly clear that all during those negotiations the 
most elaborate preparations had been going on in the Soviet 
. Union for the resumption of tests. We informally, but none the 
less sincerely, offered on several occasions to permit Soviet observ-
ers to check for themselves, to confirm the fact that we were not 
testing, provided they would permit similar observations in the 
Soviet Union, but to no avail-a circulnstance which now can be 
better understood. This whole sorry affair is bound to cast doubt 
on the prospects for other agreements. The fact that the Soviet 
Union now seeks to merge test ban talks with talks on so-called 
comprehensive disarmament, after they themselves demanded a 
separation of the two 3 years ago-a demand to which we earlier 
reluctantly agreed-accents the time we have lost and the dis-
couraging nature of the exercise in international negotiation 
through which we have just passed. I think that this phenome-
non is one of the most unfortunate developments which has 
occurred in the history of man's recent search for constructive 
steps in the field of disarmament. 
We have assumed risks during this long period of negotiation 
because we conformed to a moratorium on tests of all character, 
whether above or below ground, when it was quite clear that we 
with our open society could not and would not conduct clandes-
tine tests, while it was next to impossible for us to know whether 
the Soviets were testing secretly. Since their heavy control over 
the dissemination of information within their country continues, 
we have to insist upon reasonable verification measures within 
the Soviet Union if we are to know that obligations are being 
fulfilled. In spite of many protestations of willingness to install 
strict control measures, we have found when it comes to the actual 
agreement and implementation of them, as in the test ban, they 
are promptly repudiated as being attempts at espionage. 
s 
u.s. Determination To Halt Arms Race 
I mention all this not by way of recrimination but to add fur-
ther evidence to the already imposing array of facts to show that 
the United States, contrary to incessant charges, has n10re than 
proven its seriousness and determination to get ahead with the 
reduction of the arms race as a contribution to the maintenance 
of peace. We have, it is true, constantly stressed the need for 
controls, and it is in this feature that we have met the greatest 
obstacles in our talks with the Soviet representatives. Constantly 
the charge of espionage has been cast because as practical people 
we have sought to find the means whereby disarmament can really 
take place with the assurance that obligations were being ful-
filled. I cannot conceive of a better demonstration of the need 
for controls and verification, and of the need for careful analysis 
of general statements of willingness to submit to them, than is 
given by the Soviet conduct in the test ban negotiations. 
What continually dumfounds me is the fact that our conduct 
and actions in the way of actual disarmament, so deeply contrast-
ing with the facts as related to their armament, seem to mean 
nothing in the face of the mere statements of Soviet desire for 
disarmament. I know of no more striking example in history 
of a determination 'to lay aside the implements of war than was 
contained in the Baruch Plan where, after alone achieving the 
invention of the atom bomb, we sought immediately after the 
war to subject it and all the Inaterials which could aid in its 
production to strict and clearly defined international control. 
Ho,v in the face of this and our record of deep reduction of our 
forces and armalnent after both "Vorld War I and 'Vorld 1-Var II, 
when others retained theirs, 've can justly be accused of threaten-
ing the peace of the world by the maintenance of large armaments 
I fail to see. I fail to understand it, but the fact is we frequently 
are, or at best we are equated with those who have never done 
as much. 
The Inost effective and the lllost drastic exanlples of disarlna-
ment in history made by any great po,Yer have been made by 
the United States. The charge has, as a Inatter of fact, fre-
quently been leveled at us with some justice that we have preju-
diced the cause of peace because ·we have disarmed so promptly 
and so rapidly after the passage of the eIllergency. "Ve demobi-
lized over 11 l11illion men in a little over a year after World 
'Var II, while the Red Army was maintained at a level so high 
that in relation to ours it simply did not disarm. 
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The fact that there has been a rather prevalent opinion abroad 
among those who go under the title of "unalined" that the Soviet 
Union, of all nations, has been more sincerely devoted to the cause 
of disarmament than ,ve. is simply another tribute to the power 
and persuasive effects of incessant propaganda and in some cases 
to the extreme hesitancy of many nations who cherish their non-
alinement to express any open criticism except in one direction. I 
really shudder to think what form the resolutions from Belgrade 
would have taken had the United States been the first nation to 
resume testing-and in the atmosphere at that. There is a certain 
WTy complilnent involved perhaps in the fact that more is ex-
pected of the United States than from others, or even in the fact 
that there is less to fear from us. It is not too warming a compli-
ment, however, nor is it particularly well designed to induce 
restraint upon the other party. 
All this is most discouraging, but the obligation to continue 
to search for the solution is clear; and if we are to deal intelli-
gently and practically with this matter of disarmament with the 
,vorId in the state in which it is no\y, it seems obvious that we 
must be certain that we are well equipped to do it. It requires 
study and skill to make our own sensible proposals, and the same 
requirements are needed if we are to analyze correctly those 
proposals which are made to us. The subject dernands continuity 
of thought and preparation. "Ve need the highest order of talent 
in the scientific field; we need the best strategic thinkers we can 
find; we need skillful draftsmen and negotiators; we need states-
men aware of the forces and opinions whieh play about the 
,Yorld. Our security, if not our survival, deInands it. It is far 
too vital a subject to be buried in a subordinate bureau of an 
existing GoverIunent department, and I say this to other govern-
ments as well as IUY own. And you understand I am not talking 
of the United States alone when I say "our." I aIU talking of the 
free world-all of that world that wants to live in peace and 
freedom. It is dangerous to come forward with an ill-thought-
out proposal to meet a particular negotiating due date, and on 
the other hand it is not enough to refuse to take any action at all 
,vhene the situa.tion clearly demands that we should. Security 
can be prejudiced either way. 
A Disarmament Agency 
Perhaps I have dwelt too long on this subject, but it does in 
my judgment carry some deep implications for you as leaders 
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in your respective countries, and as industrialists, and I grow a 
little sensitive when nlany of my friends say, "Why is McCloy, 
who has been so long involved in preparing for the defense of 
our country, asking Congress no,v of all times to pass a bill setting 
up an agency to deal with disarmament problems?" I believe 
I have already indicated the answer, but you may have noted that 
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee unanimously reported out 
this last week such a bill and it passed the Senate with a large 
majority. I think it is interesting to note the type of men who 
testified in its favor. First there was the President's own strong 
message. It was warmly endorsed by President Eisenhower, by 
General Lemnitzer, by Secretary ~fcN alnara, by Under Secretary 
Gilpatric of the 'Defense Depart.ment, by General Gruenther, by 
General Clay, by General Ed Hull of Korea fame, by Secretary 
of State Rusk, by former Secretary of Defense Lovett, by former 
Secretary of State Herter, by Alnbassador Cabot Lodge, by Tom 
Gates, former Secretary of Defense, by Fred Eaton, a former 
negotiator at Geneva, by Ambassador 1Vadsworth, also a former 
negotiator, and others of similar standing. These men certainly 
cannot be considered insensitive to the security needs of the coun-
try and of the times. Their character and experience is another 
demonstration of the attitude with which serious men, all of 
whom have been charged at one time or another with the pro-
tection of this nation's security, view the problem which not 
only this nation but mankind faces in this thermonuclear era. 
But disarmament is not alone the answer to the cause of peace. 
History will show, I believe, that some wars have been induced 
by disarmanlent rather than by armament. Disarmament itself 
is not synonymous with peace or with the millennium. It could, 
if improperly implemented, produce disaster; but if continuous 
and prolific arming with thermonuclear and other nlass destructive 
weapons is not stopped, and if we do not find the honorable 
substitute for war, one day it is almost inevitable we will all 
share disaster. Concurrent with any drastic development in 
disarmanlent, there must be erected a better method than we now 
have for maintaining the peace. We have to' have better and 
more freque.ntly accepted means of set.tling our international dis-
putes. Unless we do, we shall never have full, 01"1 should say 
perhaps even significant, disarmament. vVe may have some forms 
of arms control, but even here these can readily be swept away if 
we do not find the means wherein our procedures for settling our 
international disputes are effective and at hand. 
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There are some who will say that this is Utopian, that great 
nations willl].ever submit what they term their vital interests to 
any form of adjudication they do not control. I recognize this 
creates problems, for us as well as for other nations, particularly 
the Soviet Union; but the alternative with the existence of 100 
megaton bombs (5,000 times as great as the Hiroshima bomb-
it is not clear that we could not make one 50,000 times as big) or 
the use of refinements in bacteriological, chemical, and radiological 
warfare, some developments of which likewise defy imagination-
but the alternative, I say, is a very real and a very sinister one. 
Viewed in this light, it may make the search for better means of 
settling our differences seem much less Utopian and much more 
necessitous. 
I am not going to speak of Berlin. We all can sense the serious-
ness of that situation, unless we just refuse to think about it. All 
should know that we do not intend to surrender our rights, and 
we all should now know something, at least, of the intent of the 
leaders of the Soviet Union in regard to Berlin and Germany. 
We all know that we are not dealing only ,vith the fortunes of a 
single city, or only with Germany, for that matter. We know 
we are dealing with the standing and integrity of the whole free 
world. The subject is too delicate for us to be proffering solutions 
from this platform, but as businessm-en we no longer can continue 
to look only at the industrial problems of the world and think 
we are doing our full duty or, as we are prone to call it, "minding 
our business." There may very well be no industrial problems to 
worry about if we do not look up from our concentration on pro-
ducing and marketing problems and start thinking right a way as 
to ho,v we are to solve t.he greater issues vlith which the world is 
now faced and will be faced perhaps before our industrial prob-
lems can be solved. 
In the first place we have to recognize that there has developed 
a deep cleavage in the ,vorld-ideological, economic, and social. 
It is one of the great developments of history. We find great 
areas of the ,vorld emerging frOln a protected, underdeveloped 
state into independence with an intense desire to share the af-
fluence of a life of whose existence they have only recently become 
aware. It is the era of rising expectations. And in addition we 
are faced with a tremendous population explosion with its attend-
ant needs and demands. This explosion is not very far ahead, 
and it is an explosion which may also be nleasured in megatonage 
so far as its effects on mankind are concerned. And we are faced 
with the need for meeting the threats of cataclysmic war. 
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"Vhere does industry and business fit into all this turbulence? 
1Vhat is our obligation and our imperative? I do not know the 
answer, but son1ehow in this connection I am reminded of that 
story they tell of Carlyle when someone reported to him that a 
fan10us lady philosopher and critic of the day, Margaret Fuller, 
had finally decided she ,vould accept the universe. "By Gad, she'd 
better!" said Carlyle. Business and industry had better pause 
and look at the universe and its condition, for the very environ-
luent in which it lives and moves is taking on SOlne extremely 
menacing shapes. Its ills are becoming too much for just the 
statesmen of the world to deal with, luuch less the statesmen of 
anyone nation to deal with, however strong and wealthy that 
nation may be. Vast challenges lie right ahead. We can see the 
economic and scientific challenges right on our doorstep. There 
is a dynamism bred of a movement which is stirring vast numbers 
of people situated in some of the largest areas of the world, and 
the industry of the free world must find its proper relation to it. 
The Common Market 
I feel that the organization of the Comlnon Market and the 
unification of Europe may point the way, may give us the direc-
tion light for our course. We have seen ho,v dangerous dictator-
ships n1ay hecome, how unreliable they are, how frequently they 
breed excesses and ,vars. If they can marshal great 111a5SeS of 
people, which they bid fair to do, does not the free "orld have to 
set about the organization of its resources, hun1an and material, 
in a far better form than ,ve have thus far advanced? We are 
experiencing now the difficulties of coordinating a policy between 
this continent and the European Continent. At the same time 
there are tremendous forces doing their utmost to divide us and 
frustrate our determination and our strength. The European 
Continent is itself painfully far from having and asserting the 
unity the times den1and. There is still an outdated inclination 
in Europe to dwell on its own weakness. For too many years, in 
my judglnent, Europe has been insisting upon this weakness and 
its inability to playa n1ajor part in the determination of world 
affairs. 1Vith over 200 million people, with resources and capac-
ities which n1ake those of all Russia and China quite measurable, 
with the finest accumulation of technical and managerial skills 
that probably exist anywhere, with cultural and artistic reserves 
that still lead the ,vorld, wherein does the ,veakness of Europe 
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lie except in lack of cohesion, in lack of proper organization and 
ability to express its strength. And ,vhen this great reserve of 
strength, properly organized and speaking with the general 
unanimity which its common position and interest should, with 
proper effort and will, make possible, is added to that of the 
American Continent and the British Isles and other parts of the 
free world, all other combinations fall quickly into a much less 
imposing perspective. 
There would be no thought of attacking such strength if it ,,,ere 
clear that it was determined to protect its common interest and 
heritage. Not only would the problem of peace in this world be· 
advanced, but most of the problems of the underdeveloped nations 
of the world would promptly be brought into far better control. 
No other group could approach the capital resources, skills, or 
the markets on which improvement in these areas will depend. 
All this sounds like a large order, but what has already been 
accomplished in Europe is an indication of what the energy of 
a relatively few lnen and minds can achieve, and the times 
demand large orders in view of the threats which beset the free 
world. 
I read a book the other day ,vhich I am sure many of you have 
read. It is Clarence Randall's Folklore of Management. It is 
not a profound book perhaps, but it is a very readable one, and 
it explodes a number of the fetishes ,yith which industry and its 
leaders have been deluding themselves in the face of an inter-
dependent, changing, and menacing world. There should be a 
counterpart or counterparts of that book, and I can think of their 
titles right a way. One should be written entitled the "Folklore 
of Politics" and another "The Folklore of Labor." The point 
is that the tiIne has come to reappraise all our compartmentalized 
thinking, and rapidly. 
Your presence here in such nUlnbers and distinction is a clear 
indication that yon have, like Carlyle's lady, accepted the ,vorld. 
Yon know yery well it is n10re than the industrial, commercial, 
and economic aspects of the ,vorld that now demand your atten-
tion. The emergence of the ultimate weapon, the challenge of 
space, the great ideologica.l conflict, the rising expectations of 
billions of people, the increase in the world population, the de-
velopment of science, the threat of suicidal war, the still un-
organized potential of the free world, the need to preserve and 
carryon the mighty revolutionary traditions of the freedom of 
the individual which once again are being threatened-are not 
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these the keynotes which any such distinguished group as this 
gathered in these days should weigh and consider no matter what 
else may be on the agenda for discussion ~ 
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Working Toward a World Without War 
BY ADLAI E. STEVENSON 
W AR is one of our oldest institutions. It is deeply imbedded in the traditions, the folkways, the literature, even the 
values of most all countries. It has engaged talented men and 
produced national heroes. At the same time, civilized men and 
women for centuries past have abhorred the immorality of organ-
ized killing of men by men. Yet let us confess at once, to our 
common shame, that this deep sense of revulsion has not averted 
wars; nor shortened one by a day. 
While I do not say that all wars have been started for un-
worthy purposes, let us also confess-morality to the side-that 
most all past wars have served to promote what was conceived 
to be the national or princely or religious interests of those who 
fought them-or at least those who won them. For in past wars 
there have been winners as well as losers, the victors and the van-
quished, the decorated and the dead. In the end, valuable real 
estate and other riches have changed hands. Thrones have been 
won, regimes transferred, rule extended, religions and ideologies 
imposed, empires gained-and lost, aggressions halted or advanced. 
Thus wars in the past have sometimes been a means of settling 
international disputes, of changing political control, of inducing 
social transformation, and even of stimulating science and 
technology . 
And I suppose that on moral grounds it is only a difference of 
degree whether millions are killed or only thousands-whether 
the victims include children in the debris of a big city building or 
only young men lying on a battlefield in the countryside. N or has 
war been a very efficient way of settling disputes. Yesterday'S 
enemies are today's friends. First the victor pays for destruction 
of his enemy, then for reconstruction of his friend. 
But war in the future would differ fundamentally from war in 
the past-not in degree but in kind. It is this which seems so 
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difficult to grasp. Thermonuclear war cannot serve anyone's na-
tional interest-no matter how moral or immoral that interest 
may be, no matter how just or unjust, no matter how noble or 
ignoble-regardless of the nation's ideology, faith, or social 
system. 
It is no satisfaction to suggest that the issue of morality in war 
thus has become academic. Yet this is the fact, and perhaps it 
will serve to clarify the dialog of war and peace. For we can 
now free our collective conscience of nice ethical distinctions and 
face the stark, amoral fact that war has ceased to be practical, that 
no nation can contemplate resort to nlodern war except in defense 
against ' intolerable exaction or aggression. Therefore we must 
abolish war to save our collective skins. For as long as this nuclear 
death dance continues, millions-tens of millions-perhaps hun-
dreds of millions are living on borrowed tiIne. 
I suggested a moment ago that war is such an ancient institu-
tion, so deeply entrenched in tradition, that it requires a strenu-
ous intellectual effort to imagine a ,vorld free from war. So it 
does, and I shall have more to say about this later. But I sub-
mit that the alternative effort is to imagine a world at the end 
of another war, when great areas and great places have been 
turned into radioactive wastelands, when millions upon millions 
of people are already dead while debris from those great mush-
room clouds drifts ghoulishly over the living, when great parts 
of our institutions, ideologies, faiths, and beliefs-even our art 
and literature-lie snlashed in the smoke and rubble of material 
destruction. 
I submit that, however difficult the vision of a world without 
. 10ar may be, it is not only a happier but an easier vision to imag-
ine than one of a world after war. In any event, we must choose 
between them. 
It is against this bleak reality that we meet once again, Mr. 
Chairman, to take up the subject of disarmament. 
History of .Disarmament Negotiations 
The story of man's efforts to do . a ,yay with armaments is a 
long and sorry one. At various tinles this or that measure of 
disarmament has seemed within our grasp. My own country has 
a proud record in this respect. vVe supported the two Hague 
conferences. We took the lead in naval disarmament after World 
War I. 'Ve did our ut.most to make the comprehensive Disarma-
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ment Conference of 1932 a success. And after World War II 
we stripped our armed forces to the bone in the hope and belief 
that we had made some progress toward a peaceful world. 
Disarmament was one of the first orders of business for the 
United Nations. Fifteen years ago, at the first meeting of this 
Assembly, the United States delegation, of which I was a mem-
ber, made a proposal as revolutionary as the scientific discovery 
which prompted it. At that time we proposed to destroy the 
few atomic weapons ·which the United States alone possessed, to 
outlaw forever the manufacture of such weapons, to place the 
development of atomic energy in all its forms under the full 
control of the United Nations, and to turn over to this Organiza-
tion all facilities and all information bearing on atomic science 
and technology; all this to prevent an atomic arms race. 
The world does not need to be reminded here of the tragic 
consequences of the rejection of that initiative of a decade and 
a half ago. Since then there has been a long series of commis-
sions, committees, subcommittees, and conferences, inside the 
United Nations and out, which have tried to deal with the question 
of general disarmament and first steps toward it. 
After the Sov:et delegation walked out of the 10-power general 
disarmament talks in June 1960, our main hopes were focused 
on the 3-power negotiations at Geneva for a treaty to ban the 
testing of atomic weapons. After 2112 years of patient negotia-
tions, in the course of which significant progress was made, the 
United States and Britain tabled a comprehensive treaty which 
they had every reason to believe would meet the remaining points 
of difference with the Soviet Union. The United States and 
Britain were prepared to sign a comprehensive treaty at onoo-
and still are. 
Then on the last day of last August came the shocking news 
that the Soviet Union would break the moratorium which it had 
advocated and vowed never to break. The United States and 
Britain immediately offered to agree with the Soviet Union to 
ban at once all tests in the atmosphere without inspection-to 
spare mankind the hazards of radioactive fallout. We regret . 
that, like the Baruch proposals, this offer was also rejected by 
the Soviet Union. 
Since that time the $oviet Union has carried on a series of 
nuclear weapons tests ·with unprecedented pollution of the atmos-
phere. It was clinlaxed by the explosion of history's most appall-
ing weapon, a superbomb of more than 50 megatons, or more 
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than 50 million tons of TNT. This weapon's destructive power 
exceeds any known military requirements. So its principal 
purpose is to serve the political strategy of terror. 
This action was taken in disregard of pleas from governments 
and peoples all over the non-Communist world-and, finally, in 
defiance of an unprecedented resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly supported by 87 nations. 
To all our pleas the Soviet Union, for months past, has invari-
ably replied that it will agree to a ban on nuclear tests only as 
part of an agreement for general and complete disarmament. 
By insisting on this link between an issue which we had nearly 
resolved and the difficult issue of disarmament, the Soviet Union 
has tightened the knot and made it harder than ever to untie. 
Only last Thursday the General Assembly rejected the idea of 
delaying a test ban treaty by calling once again, by a vote of 
71 to 11, for the urgent resumption of negotiations to outlaw 
nuclear tests. 
So let me point out at once to the distinguished representative 
of the Soviet Union that it is his country alone which insists on 
making a genuine and effective test ban dependent on the achieve-
ment of general disarmament. And because it does so insist, 
the Soviet Union, as we now move into the debate on general 
and complete disarmament, becomes doubly answerable to world 
opinion. The world will look to them in this debate to answer 
not one but two burning que~tions: Do you or don't you want 
disarmament ~ and-once again-Do you or don't you want an 
end to nuclear weapons, in fact or just in rhetoric ~ 
And yet there is this much connection between the two sub-
jects: The advance in weapons technology as a result of tests must 
ultimately increase our common peril. It is a measure of the 
tragic failure of all our efforts to reach disarmament agreements . 
. A.nd it is a compelling challenge to my Government to try again-
to make a fresh start-to insist with the utmost urgency that the 
weapons which have made war an obsolete institution be laid 
aside quickly before others are forced in self-defense to carry 
this insensate race yet another stage toward ultimate folly. 
No doubt there are those who will ask how we can dare realis-
tically to speak of disarmament today, when the winds of conflict 
blow all about us. There are those who will ask whether this 
is mere wishful thinking, whether this is more t.han escapism. 
To that we would reply: Escapism, no; escape, yes. For man 
must escape, not in wishful dreams but in hard reality. We must 
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escape from this spiral of fear, from the outmoded illusion that 
lasting security for peoples can be found by balancing out the 
wildly destructive power in the hands of their governments. 
As President Kennedy said to the General Assembly on 
September 25: 
Today, every inhabitant of this planet must contemplate the day when 
this planet may no longer be habitable. Every man, woman, and child 
Ii ves under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of 
threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation 
or by madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they 
abolish us. 
President Kennedy informed the General Assembly then that 
the United States has prepared a new set of proposals for gen-
eral and complete disarmament. These proposals were circulated 
subsequently to all members. 
He also outlined my Government's conception of what is needed 
to create a world without war. It is a view which embraces first 
steps, subsequent steps, and the ultimate goal at the end of the 
road. And it goes far beyond the technical steps in arms reduc-
tion. It requires the reservation of outer space for peaceful 
uses. It includes international programs for economic and social 
progress. And it insists especially upon the essential need to 
build up the machinery of peace while we tear down the machin-
ery of war-that these ill ust go hand in hand, that these, indeed, 
must be but two parts of a single program. 
For in a world without arms, military power would be taken 
out of the hands of nations; but other forms of power would 
remain-and mostly in the hands of the same states which are the 
most powerful military states today. 
Conflicting ideologies would still be with us. 
Political struggles would still take place. 
Social systems would still be subject to disruptive pressures 
from within and without. 
Economic strength would still be a factor in, and an instrument 
of, national foreign policies. 
And the world would still be the scene of peaceful transforma-
tions-for it cannot and should not remain static. 
Let us be clear about all this: Disarmament alone will not 
purify the human race of the last vestiges of greed, ambition, and 
brutality, of false pride and the love of power. N or will it cleanse 
every last national leader of the least impulse to international 
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lawlessness. No sane and honest man can pretend to foresee such 
a paradise on earth-even an earth without arms. But it would be 
a safer earth, where the contest and conflict could be waged in 
peace. 
Clearly, then, disarmament will not usher in utopia. But it 
will prevent the wanton wastage of life and the wholesale destruc-
tion of material resources. And it will free the energies of man 
to 'engage in beneficent pursuits. How much could be done to 
improve the conditions of man-his education, his health, his 
nutrition, and his housing-if even a small portion of the funds 
and the ingenuity of man now devoted to improving the art of 
killing were transferred to improving the art of living! 
Who would keep the peace in a disarmed world ~ How would 
our disputes get settled when arms have been taken away ~ 
If we can answer these questions, we are much nearer to a solu-
tion of the problem of disarn1ament. For these questions open up 
the unexplored ground between first steps toward disarmament 
and the vision at the end of the road. And the vision of a world 
free from war will remain a utopian illusion until means for keep-
ing the peace lend it reality. 
It therefore seems clear to me that the only way to general and 
complete disarmament lies along two parallel paths which must 
be traveled together. One leads to the absence of arms, the other 
to the presence of adequate machinery for keeping the peace. As 
we destroy an obsolete institution for the settlement of disputes, 
we must create new institutions for the settlement of disputes-
and simultaneously. 
Let me repeat for emphasis. We do not hold the vision of a 
world without conflict. We do hold the vision of a world without 
war-and this inevitably requires an alternative system for coping 
with conflict. We cannot have one without the other. But if we 
travel the two roads together, if we build as we destroy, we can 
solve the technical problems of dismantling the vast apparatus of 
war. 
u.s. Proposal for Disarmament 
Let me come now to the United States proposals for dismantling 
the towering and costly machinery of war. 
To begin with, the United States emphatically embraces the 
commitment to general and complete disarmament. We proclaim 
the goal-without reservation-and in the shortest possible span 
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of time. And we take this ter.tnillology to mean exactly what it 
says: the general and com J..'let~ disarmament of all national forces 
capable of international aggression and the safe disposal of all 
their arms. 
It is interesting to note that the conference of nonalined nations 
which met in Belgrade in September of this year demonstrates 
how widely shared our goal is. I quote their words: 
The participants in the Conference consider that disarmament is an im-
perative need and the most urgent task of mankind. A radical solution of 
this problem, which has become an urgent necessity in the present state of 
armaments, in the unanimous view of participating countries, can be 
achieved only by means of a general, complete and strictly and interna-
tionally controlled disarmament. 
Mr. Chairman, the United States proposal is, indeed, a "radic~l" 
one. 
It calls for large reductions of armaments even in the first 
stages-both conventional and nuclear armaments. 
It calls for an end to production of fissionable materials for 
weapons purposes, and the transfer of such materials from exist-
ing stocks for nonweapons use. 
The program call~ for a stop in the further development of in .. 
dependent national nuclear capabilities. 
It calls for the destruction or conversion to peaceful uses of 
strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles. 
It calls for an end to the production of such delivery vehicles. 
It calls for the abolition of chemical, biological, and radioactive 
\veapons. 
In short, the United States program calls for the total elimina-
tion of national capacity to make international war. And, to 
insure that all these steps are actually carried out by each side, 
every step o! the way, the plan calls for the creation of an Inter-
national Disarmament Organization within the famework of the 
United Nations. 
If the United States program is comprehensive, it also is flex-
ible. It does not pretend to be the final word-nor would we 
wish it to be. We expect it to be examined exhaustively, to be 
altered and to be improved. It certainly is not perfect; but it 
can stand up to close scrutiny, for it has been prepared at great 
pains and in good faith. It is presented in dead earnest and in 
the conviction that propaganda on the subject of disarmament is 
a cynical and cruel mockery of man's deepest hope. 
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Need for Adequate Verificati(;tl 
At one point and one point alone the United States is, and will 
remain, inflexible: This is on the familiar question of verification, 
on the indispensable need for the world to know that disarmament 
agreements are, in fact, being carried out. Because of the con-
fusion that persists on this point, I must dwell upon it for a 
moment. 
First of all, verification must be understood not as a technical 
point but as a fundamental principle-as the essential condition 
for any significant progress in disarmament-as its sine qua non. 
To pretend that there is enough confidence between the major 
armed powers to accept disarmament without verification is to 
deny the existence of the arms race itself. For the arms race is 
nothing if not living proof of the absence of mutual trust, and 
confidence has been rudely shaken by recent events. 
I will say quite bluntly that mistrust exists on our side, and 
how could it be otherwise ~ The hostility of Soviet leaders toward 
my country, its institutions, and its way of life is proclaimed, 
documented, and demonstrated in a thousand ways. Yet we 
earnestly seek agreement with them-through diplomatic methods 
and through agreements . recorded in words and deeds. So we 
may be excused, it seems to me, if we are wary of agreements 
deeply involving our national security with a nation whose recent 
leader wrote this: "Good words are a mask for the concealment 
of bad deeds. Sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry 
water or iron wood." 
These are the words of the late Marshal Stalin. I am aware 
that his former absolute authority has been subject to a certain 
reevaluation recently. But the present Premier of the Soviet 
Union, who served Stalin so loyally, still proclaims his indebted-
ness to Lenin. And after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk Lenin said 
this: 
We must demobilize the army as quickly as possible, because it is a sick 
organ; meanwhile we will assist the Finnish Revolution. Yes, of course 
we are viola ting the Treaty; we have violated it thirty or forty times. 
More recently we have seen wholesale violation of agreements 
pledging self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe-
not to mention so contemporary an event as the erection of a wall 
through the middle of a city in violation of a postwar agreement. 
Mr. Chairman, I do not mention these matters to belabor the 
dead, nor to rub salt in wounds both old and fresh, nor to becloud 
the disarmament problem with irrelevant questions. They are 
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not irrelevant, because there can be no disarmament without agree-
ment and because clear warnings and harsh experience have 
taught us to insist upon independent and international verifica-
tion of agreements with the Soviet Union. 
Our deepest hope--our most fervent prayer-is for proof that 
this acquired lack of trust will no longer be justified. Meanwhile 
we do not ask that those who are suspicious of us take · us at our 
word. We offer to them the same guarantees that we have the 
right and duty to demand of them. We offer to submit to verifica-
tion procedures under international control at each step of 
disarmament. 
Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the United States 
has no interest in controls for the sake of controls. We do not 
wish to buy control or to trade something for it. We have no 
stake in playing the host to teams of foreign inspectors within 
our borders. But there is no other way to dispel mistrust, to 
exorcise suspicion, to begin to build the mutual confidence upon 
which peaceful cooperation ultimately depends. 
So we accept the need for adequate verification procedures. We 
recognize the right of others to assure themselves that we in fact 
do what we say we shall do with respect to disarmameJ?t. 
But in the meantime we must find a · basis for workable 
agreement. 
Last spring, as delegates here will recall, this committee 
agreed to postpone further discussion of disarmament so that 
the United States and the Soviet Union could exchange views "on 
questions relating to disarmament and to the resumption of nego-
tiations in an appropriate body whose composition is to be agreed 
upon." 
Beginning on June 19 and ending on September 19, meeting 
in Moscow, Washington, and New York, representatives of the 
Soviet Union and the United States discussed these two questions. 
The results of these talks were reported to the General Assembly 
by the United States and the Soviet Union in a Joint Statement 
of Agreed Principles, which is before· this committee, document 
A/4879. 
This report shows that, although our conversations did not 
bring complete success, neither did they bring complete failure. 
We were unable to agree on a forum for negotiations. But we 
did agree on a set of principles to guide negotiations on 
disarmament. 
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The U.S. Government welcomed this limited agreement with 
some hope, especially since the Soviet and American delegates 
agreed quite explicitly to the implementation of all disan11ament 
measures, from beginning to end, under international control. 
This looked like a very bright spot on a dark horizon-perhaps 
a real breakthrough to\\:"ard a world without an11S. 
But, Mr. Chairman, our hopes have been restrained by the Soviet 
refusal to follow through on this aspect of the agreed principles. 
In his address to the plenary n1eeting of the General Assembly 
on September 26, Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
A. Gromyko] made the following statement: 
After all, no one knows right now what armaments and armed forces 
the states possess. This is quite normal. For perfectly obvious reasons 
states do not reveal that kind of information and the same situation will 
endure after the implementation of disarmament measures provided for 
in this or that state, pending the completion of general and complete 
disarmament. 
What can this possibly mean ~ The meaning is that to our 
Soviet colleagues inspection should apply to the destruction of 
armaments-but not to existing armaments or the production of 
new ones. 
Apparently we are being asked to establish an elaborate inter-
national inspection force simply to witness the destruction of 
certain quantities and categories of arms, with no know ledge of 
what remains-to watch while one weapon is junked without see-
ing whether two others are in production to take its place, perhaps 
in reality to certify the disposal of inventories of obsolete equip-
ment. I am reminded of the story of the little boy who was 
showing off his conjuring tricks and said to his parents: "I am 
going to do some magic for you, but you have to promise not to 
look." 
The Soviet position thus seems to be the same as it was when 
the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, addressed a 
letter to the U.S. disarmament representative, Mr. [John J.] Mc-
Cloy, on September 21, at the conclusion of the bilateral Soviet-
American disarmament negotiations. Mr. McCloy had noted that 
the Soviet Union had refused to accept, in the Statement of Agreed 
Principles, a clause reading 
Such verification should ensure that not only agreed limitations or reduc-
tions take place but also that retained armed forces and armaments do not 
exceed agreed levels at any stage. 
Now, Mr. President, this sentence seemed to us to represent a 
sine qua non for any effect ive verification and control. But in his 
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reply Mr. Zorin insisted that such control-that is, control over 
the armed forces and armaments retained by states at any given 
stage of disarmament--would turn into what he called an inter-
national system of recognized espionage. 
If it is the position of the Soviet Union that verification of 
agreed levels of armaments retained by states under a disarma-
ment plan is espionage, then clearly there can be no general and 
complete disarmament agreement, for armaments destroyed are of 
less concern to us than armaments retained. It is the latter and 
not the former which states attacked in war would have to fear. 
No matter how many weapons were destroyed, it would be the 
weapons which were left that would be utilized in a military 
operation. This is a stumbling block which could be crucial. Un-
less we can get a clear and satisfactory agreement on this par-
ticular point, it is difficult to envisage very substantial progress in 
disarmament negotiations. 
For under the Soviet concept of disarmament inspection, the 
arms race could continue and the arsenals of war could be larger 
and deadlier at the end of the first stage of "disarmament" than at 
the beginning. In short, we would disarm in public and be per-
fectly free to rearm in secret. 
Mr. Chairman, this interpretation turns common sense on its 
head and makes mockery of logic. This turns reason into gib-
berish, meaning into nonsense, words into water. 
The purpose of disarmament is to abolish war precisely by 
abolishing the means of making war-which is to say, the arma-
ments and armed forces with which wars are fought. If dis-
armament does not mean the reduction of the actual levels of 
armament, it has no meaning at all. 
I can only hope that Soviet delegates will not persist in their 
attitude. If I have misunderstood the position I shall be happy 
to be informed, and we can go forward. For on their face the 
principles agreed between the United States and the U.S.S.R. do 
provide sound and workable guidelines for serious disarmament 
negotiations, and I prefer to think that they represent an im-
portant step in the right direction. 
Question of the Proper Forum 
This brings us to the question of the proper forum. During our 
exchanges with the Soviet Union on this point we of the United 
States tried to reach agreement on a formula which could then 
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be recommended to the other states concerned. Our position on 
the exact representation was and still is flexible. These proposals 
can be found in document A/4880. In fact we suggested four 
possible alternative solutions, but to no avail. The Soviet Union 
continued to insist on a formula which we felt ,vas restrictive and 
based on artificial and arbitrary criteria. 
Quite frankly, we have grown a little weary of the repeated 
Soviet demands for changes in the negotiating forum on disarma-
ment. The history of the disarmament talks is full of them. The 
Ten-Nation Committee was established at Soviet insistence. This 
was because they seemed to set great store by what they called 
"parity" in numbers of delegations between their side and the 
West-even though on the Western side there are several major 
powers and on their side there has been only one. Then when the 
Soviets found that the negotiations in the Ten -Nation Committee 
were not to their liking, they abruptly broke off the talks and de~ 
manded an entirely new forum. 
Now the latest Soviet proposal for altering the forum into 
three "groups" is all too reminiscent of the Soviet view, which is 
quite extraneous to disarmament and quite unacceptable to many 
other nations: the view that the world can be neatly divided into 
three so-called "blocs." 
The United States recognizes that all nations have a vital stake 
in the cause of peace and disarmament. On that basis we sup-
ported in past years the expansion of the United Nations Disar-
mament Commission to include all members of the United Nations. 
We recognize, in fact, that the world outside the old Ten-Nation 
Committee is much larger and more populous than the countries 
represented in that Committee. Therefore, if we do expand its 
membership, we would be inclined to include additional nlembers 
to insure the representation and the advice of the world at large. 
This is the sense of our proposal to add 10 members to the Ten-
Nation Committee which was carrying on disarmament negotia-
tions in 1960, on the basis of equitable geographic distribution. 
We hope the Soviet Union is ready to discuss with us the com-
position of the negotiating forum. I am sure most of the mem-
bers of the committee would welcome an agreement on this point 
which, would enable us to get started on the substantive negotia-
tions which have been interrupted ever since the U.S.S.R. decided 
it did not like the 10-nation forum it had demanded. The world 
wants disarmament, and so do we, and not everlasting negotiations 
about the number of negotiators. 
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While we consider the first moves toward disarmament, ,ve can 
begin right away to strengthen our machinery for . keeping the 
peace. We can do this without hampering our efforts to reach 
agreement on disarmament. Every step to improve the machin-
ery of peace will make it easier to take the next step in destroying 
the machinery of war. 
We need not even be at a loss as to where to begin or how to 
proceed. The experience of the United Nations itself gives us 
a starting point and a guideline. In its earliest years the United 
Nations had successful experience with mediation and concilia-
tion. It defended collective security and the independence of 
small nations against their assailants in Korea. Then, at a time 
of urgent need in the Middle East, the United Nations acquired 
an effective po,ver to police the lines of an armistice agreement. 
At another time of great need-in the Congo-it added an effec-
tive power to use force, if necessary, to restore order and to pre-
vent a civil war. Out of such emergencies, the United Nations 
is becoming a stronger instrument for keeping the peace. 
It will have to be much stronger still. Our task now is to 
strengthen, refine, and develop more fully the peacekeeping struc-
ture of the United Nations. 
';V e can begin by drawing lessons from the United Nations' 
most recent experience in the Congo. From this operation it is 
not difficult to see that effectiveness in such peacemaking missions 
depends in large measure on four things: first, the ready avail-
ability and mobility of national units; second, their discipline 
and training and capacity to work with contingents of other 
nationalities; third, the length of their commitment; and, fourth, 
a clear chain of command flowing from United Nations 
Headquarters. 
Improving U.N. Peacekeeping Machinery 
When the United Nations is so often pitted in a race against 
time, we risk a dangerous vacuum during the interval while 
military forces are being assembled. And we further risk a 
dangerous erosion in the political and moral authority of the 
United Nations if troops trained for national forces are thrust 
without special training into situations unique to the purposes 
and methods of the United Nations, or if such troops are either 
kept on the job without rotation, are precipitately withdrawn 
when no replacements are at hand, or are insufficiently supported 
for lack of adequate financial resources. 
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"Ve are all deeply in the debt of those officers and men who 
have served and are serving the cause of peace under the United 
Nations flag. 'Ve must proceed without delay to strengthen the 
context in which they act in this pioneering work of the United 
Nations as the guardian of peace. 
The United States has suggested that all nations .indicate the 
kind and quality of military units they might be prepared to send 
for service with the United Nations. My own country has pro-
vided very important logistic support for both UNEF [U.N. 
Emergency Force] in the Middle East and the United Nations 
Forces in the Congo. We now suggest that member countries 
make available to the United Nations an inventory of the forces, 
equipment, and logistic support which they would be prepared 
to put at the disposal of the United Nations for peace-preserving 
functions. 
But to commit such facilities on paper is not enough. The 
functions of a United Nations Force are likely to be different 
from those of national forces. The United States believes that 
national units should be specially trained for the special charac-
ter of United Nations operations. Recent United Nations experi-
ence should be studied so manuals can be prepared to assist the 
United Nations in officer training and to help member countries 
in training noncommissioned personnel. 
Such steps would strengthen the United Nations' capacity to 
serve as an international police force. But a stronger and better 
organized police force would be needed only when threats to 
peace have reached dangerous proportions. The police force, 
therefore, must be supplemented with improved machinery for 
settling disputes before they reach an explosive stage. Our task, 
here again, is to build on the existing resources of the United 
Nations, including the International Court of Justice, and to avail 
ourselves more fully of the potentials for action within these 
existing resources. 
The Secretary-General may wish to present to the United 
Nations members his own ideas for the expansion and improve-
ment of United Nations machinery for observation, factfinding, 
conciliation, mediation, and adjudication. He undoubtedly will 
wish to make use of senior members of his staff in his conciliation 
activities. The political organs themselves may wish on occasion 
to avail themselves of the services of rapporteurs. 
Moves such as these-and I hope other members will have other 
suggestions-would permit us to get on with the job of creating 
the kind of peacekeeping machinery that will be essential for 
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dealing with conflicts in a world free from war. And we can 
start them at once-even without waiting for agreement on 
disarmament. 
Taking the First Steps 
Every such move will help to reduce danger, help to lower 
distrust, help to blunt fear. The way to start is to start; and 
a good place to start is ready to hand. I refer to the proposed 
treaty whose objective it is to outlaw further testing of atomic 
devices in space, in the atmosphere, on the ground, or under 
the ground or the water, which is still tabled at Geneva. We 
are flexible about first steps; we are adamant only on the point 
that we begin at once-immediately-to disarm. 
lfr. Chairman, we can begin at once to disarm. To start now 
in no sense limits or postpones the goal of general and complete 
disarmament; indeed, this is the way to reach it faster. For 
some steps can be taken sooner than others, without disadvan-
tage to any nation or groups of nations. 
Let no one doubt our seriousness. Six weeks ago the President 
of our nation presented in person to this session of the General 
Assembly the boldest and most comprehensive plan for disarma-
ment that my nation has ever offered to the world. Since then 
he has signed into a law an act creating a new Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, directly under his authority and contain-
ing an array of expert talent whose counterpart I would be very 
happy to see in a similar agency in the Soviet Union. 
Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, it is extremely difficult for 
the mind to grasp a clear vision of a world without arms, for 
it is a condition totally foreign to the human experience. But as 
I also said earlier, it is even more difficult to envision a world 
turned to a radioactive wasteland-which may well be the alter-
native. Difficult as it is, then, we must grasp the easier and 
happier vision. 
And I do think we can see, however dimly, the general outlines 
of such a world. A world disarmed would not be utopia, but one 
suddenly blessed by freedom from war. It would not usher in 
world government, but the world community would have the ca-
pacity to keep the peace. It would not end national sovereignty, 
but the sovereign right to commit national suicide would be yielded 
up forever. 
A disarmed world would still be a world of great diversity, in 
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which no one nation could seriously pretend to have the wit and 
wisdom to manage mankind. 
It would be a world in which ideas, for the first time, could com-
pete on their own merits without the possibility of their imposition 
by force of arms. 
It would be a world in which men could turn their talents tD an 
agenda of progress and justice for all mankind i the second half 
of the 20th century. 
In short, it would not be a perfect world, but a world both safer 
and more exhilarating for us all to live in. 
There is nothing inherently inlpossible in creating the condi-
tions for a world without war. Our basic problems are not techni-
cal, mechanistic, or administrative. The basic question is whether 
every nation will agree to abandon the means to coerce others by 
force. 
If they will not, the arms race will go on. For those who love 
freedom and have the power to defend it will not be coerced. .And, 
uncertain as it is, free people prefer to live on borrowed time than 
to yield to terror. 
Conceivably the world could survive on this perpetual brink of 
universal disaster. Conceivably fortune would spare us from the 
fatal act of a lunatic, the miscalculation of an uninformed leader, 
the false step of a nervous young sentry. 
But on behalf of my Government and my people I propose that 
this Assembly set the world on the road toward freedom fronl 
war. .And I propose that this committee take the first steps by 
approving a negotiating forum, endorsing the statement of agreed 
principles already worked out by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, and recommending that the new forum get on at once 
with the first business of this dangerous world-general and com-
plete disarmament. 
I ask Mr. Zorin whether his country cannot so conduct negotia-
tions now that we and our respective allies may be able to turn to 
the rest of the members here, and to the hundreds of millions for 
whom they speak, and say: "We have not failed you." 
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u.s. Outlines Initial Proposals of Program 
for General and Complete Disarmament 
BY DEAN RUSK 
I AM h.appy t.o ?a ve the oppo~t~ity to meet in this hall with ~he foreIgn mInIsters and prIncIpal delegates of the countrIes 
participating in this conference. I bring you greetings from the 
President of the United States and the most sincere good wishes of 
the American people for the success of our work. I should like to 
open my remarks by reading a letter which the President has sent 
to me: 
As you and your colleagues from every quarter of the globe enter upon 
the work of the Geneva Disarmament Conference, it may seem unnecessary 
to state again that the hopes and indeed the very prospects of mankind are 
involved .in the undertaking in which you are engaged. And yet the fact 
that the immediate and practical Significance of the task that has 
brought you together has come to be so fully realized by the peoples 
of the world is one of the crucial developments of our time. For men now 
know that amassing of destructive power does not beget security; they know 
that polemics do not bring peace. Men's minds, men's hearts, and men's 
spiritual aspirations alike demand no less than a reversal of the course of 
recent history-a replacement of ever-growing stockpiles of destruction by 
ever-growing opportunities fo'r human achievement. It is your task as rep-
resentative of the United States to join with your colleagues in a supreme 
effort toward that end. 
This task, the foremost item on the agenda of humanity, is not a quick 
or easy one. It must be approached both boldl~ and responsibly. It is a 
task whose magnitude and urgency justifies our bringing to bear upon it the 
highest resources of creative statesmanship the international community 
has to offer, for it is the future of the community of mankind that is in-
volved. We must pledge ourselves at the outset to an unceasing effort to 
continue until the job is done. 'Ve must not be discouraged by initial dis-
agreements nor weakened in our resolve by the tensions that surround us 
and add difikulties to our task. For verifiable disarmament arrangements 
are not a fair weather phenomenon. A sea wall is not needed when the seas 
are calm. Sound disarmament agreements, deeply rooted in mankind's 
mutual interest in survival, must serve as a bulwark against the tidal waves 
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of war and its destructiveness. Let no one, then, say that we cannot arrive 
at such agreements in troubled times, for it is then their need is greatest. 
My earnest hope is that no effort will be spared to define areas of agree-
ment on all of the three important levels to which Prime Minister 
Macmillan and I referred in our joint letter of February 7 to Premier 
Khrushchev. Building upon the principles already agreed, I hope that you 
will quickly be able to report agreement on an outline defining the overall 
shape of a program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
world. I have submitted such an outline on behalf of the U.S. to the 
U.N. General Assembly last September. But an outline is not enough. 
You should seek as well, as areas of agreement emerge, a definition in 
specific terms of measures set forth in the outline. The objective should 
be to define in treaty terms the widest area of agreement that can be 
implemented at the earliest possible time while still continuing your maxi-
mum efforts to achieve agreement on those other aspects which present 
more difficulty. As a third specific objective you should seek to isolate 
and identify initial measures of disarmament which could, if put into 
effect without delay, materially improve international security and the 
prospects for further disarmament progress. In this category you should 
seek as a matter of highest priority agreement on a safeguarded nuclear 
test ban. At this juncture in history no single measure in the field of 
disarmament would be more productive of concrete benefit in the alleviation 
of tensions and the enhancement of prospects for greater progress. 
Please convey, on my behalf and on behalf of the people of the United 
States to the representatives of the nations assembled, our deep and abiding 
support of the deliberations on which you are about to embark. I pledge 
anew my personal and continuing interest in this work. 
All of us will agree, I am sure, that this conference faces one 
of the mo.st perplexing and urgent tasks on the agenda of man. 
In this endeavo.r we welco.me o.ur asso.ciatio.n ,vith delegates from 
co.untries which have · no.t previo.usly been intimately involved 
with earlier nego.tiatio.ns o.n disarmament. The dreary history 
o.f such nego.tiatio.ns sho.WS that we need their help and fresh 
Po.ints o.f view. The presence o.f these delegatio.ns reminds us, 
to.o., that arms races are no.t the exclusive co.ncern of the great 
Po.wers. Co.untries situated in every regio.n of the world are 
co.nfro.nted with their o.wn co.nflicts and tensio.ns, and so.me are 
engaged in arms competitio.n. 
Disarmament a Worldwide Responsibility 
We are no.t here dealing so.lely with a single struggle in which 
a few large states are engaged, with the rest o.f the wo.rld as 
spectato.rs. Every state has a co.ntributio.n to. make in establish-
ing the co.nditio.ns fo.r general disarmament in its o.wn way. Every 
state has a resPo.nsibility to. strive fo.r a reductio.n o.f tensio.n, 
and o.f arlnaments, in its own neighborho.o.d. 
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This means that each of us will bear personal responsibility 
for what we do here. Every speech and every act must n10ve 
us toward our common objective. At the same tilne, everyone 
of us brings to the search for disarmament a separate fund of 
experience relevant to our problem. The United States, for ex-
ample, has established a major new agency of government to 
mobilize its skills and resources to seek out and study every useful 
a pproach to arms reduction. 
What is needed is immediate reduction and eventual elimination 
of all the national armaments and anned forces required for 
making war. What is required most urgently is to stop the nu-
clear arms race. All of us recognize that this moment is critical. 
We are here because we share the conviction that the arms race 
is dangerous and that every tool of statecraft must be used to end 
it. As the President stated on March 2, the United States is con-
vinced that, "in the long run, the only real security in this age of 
nuclear peril rests not in armaments but in disarmament." 
Modern weapons have a quality new to history. A single ther-
monuclear weapon today can carry the explosive power of all the 
weapons of the last war. In the last ,var they ,vere delivered at 
300 miles per hour; today they tra vel at almost 300 miles per 
minute. Economic cost skyrockets through sophistication of de-
sign and by accelerating rates of obsolescence. 
Our objective, therefore, is clear enough. We must eliminate the 
instruments of destruction. We must prevent the outbreak of war 
by accident or by design. We must create the conditions for a 
secure and peaceful world. In so doing we can turn the mo-
mentum of science exclusively to peaceful purposes and we can 
lift the burden of the arms race and thus increase our capacity to 
raise living standards everywhere. 
A group of experts meeting at the United Nations has just 
issued an impressive report on the economic and social conse-
quences of disarmament which should stimulate us in our work. 
The experts, drawn from countries with the most diverse political 
systems, were unanimously of the opinion that the problems of 
transition connected with disarmament could be solved to the bene-
fit of all countries and that disarmament would lead to the im-
provement of world economic and social conditions. They char-
acterized the achievement of general and complete disarman1ent 
as an unqualified blessing to all mankind. 
This is the spirit in which we in the United States would deal 
with the economic readjustments required jf we should achieve 
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broad and deep cuts in the level of armaments. The United States 
is a nation with vast unfinished business. Disarmament would 
permit us to get on with the job of building a better America and, 
through expanded economic development activities, of building a 
better world. The great promise of man's capacity should not be 
frustrated by his inability to deal with war and implem'ents of 
war. Man is an inventive being; surely we can turn our hands and 
minds at long last to the task of the political inv~ntion we need 
to repeal the law of the jungle. 
Laying Basis for Disarmament 
How can we move toward such disarmament ~ 
The American people bear arms through necessity, not by 
choice. Emerging from World War II in a uniquely powerful 
military position, the United States demobilized its armed strength 
and made persistent efforts to place under international control the 
use of atomic energy, then an American monopoly. The fact that 
the story of the postwar period has forced increased defense ef-
forts upon us is a most grievous disappointment. This disappoint-
ment teaches us that reduction of tensions must go hand in hand 
with real progress in disarmament. We must, I believe, simul-
taneously work at both. 
On the one hand, it is idle to expect that we can move very far 
down the road toward disarmam'ent if those who claim to want it 
do not seek, as well, to relax tensions and create conditions of trust. 
Confidence cannot be built on a footing of threats, polemics, and 
disturbed relations. On the other hand, by reducing and finally 
eliminating means of military intimidation we might ' render our 
political crises less acutely dangerous and provide greater scope 
for their settlement by peaceful means. 
I would be less than candid if I did not point out the harmful 
effect which deliberately stimulated crises can have on our work 
here. In the joint statement of agreed principles for disarma-
ment negotiations published on September 20, 1961, the United 
States and the Soviet Union affirmed that, "to facilitate the at-
tainment of general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world 
it is important that all States abide by existing international 
agreements, refrain from any actions which might aggravate in-
ternational tensions, and that they seek settlement of all disputes 
by peaceful means." Yet we are confronted by crises which in-
evitably cast their shadows into this meeting room. 
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The same can be said for the failure of our efforts, so hopefully 
begun, to conclude an effective agreement for ending nuclear 
weapon tests. There is an obvious lesson to be drawn from these 
considerations. The lesson is that general and complete disarma-
ment must be accompanied by the establishment of reliable pro-
cedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective 
arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with 
the principles of the United Nations Charter. For the rule and 
spirit of law must prevail if the world is to be disarmed. 
As we make progress in this conference, ,ve shall have to lay 
increasing stress on this point. A disarmed world must be a law-
abiding world in which a United Nations peace force can cope 
with international breaches of the peace. In the words of the 
joint statement: "Progress in disarmament should be accompanied 
by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peac-e and 
the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means." 
Fortunately there is one sign which can give us hope that this 
conference will in good time lay the foundation stones for a world 
without war. For the first time a disarmament conference is 
beginning its activities within an agreed framework-the joint 
statement of agreed princi ples-w hich all our governments have 
welcomed along with every other member of the United Nations. 
The United States considers the joint statement as its point of 
departure. Our objective is to build on tha;t foundation and to 
give practical application to the principles. 
The United States program for general and complete dis-
armament in a peaceful world, introduced in the United Nations 
on September 25, 1961, was presented to give life to the agreed 
principles. It is comprehensive in its scope and in its descrip-
tion of the-subjects suitable for action in the first and subsequent 
stages of the disarmament process. It is framed so as to avoid 
impairment of the security of any state. Ii aims at balanced and 
verified disarmament in successive stages. It is not immutable, 
however. It is designed to serve as a basis for negotiation. 
This conference also has before it another plan, presented by 
the Soviet Union. A comparison of the two plans will show some 
areas of agreenlent. We believe it is the task of the conference 
to search for broader areas of accord leading to specific steps 
which all can take with confidence. 
At this meeting the United States wishes to put forward some 
suggestions and proposals regarding the course of our future 
activity, first as to objective and procedure, then as to a program 
of work for the conference. 
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We believe that the ultimate objective should be the working 
out in detail of a treaty or treaties putting into effect an agreed 
program for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
world. To bring this about we propose that all of our delegations 
agree to continue our efforts at this conference without interrup-
tions, other than those we all agree to be desirable or necessary 
for our task, until a total program for general and complete dis-
armament has been achieved. 
As for procedures we propose that we find means of achieving 
maximum informality and flexibility. We do not believe that 
the best way to make progress is to concentrate our time and efforts 
in protracted or sterile debate. Accordingly the United States 
will propose that, as soon as ample opportunity has been allowed 
for opening statements, the schedule of plenary meetings be re-
duced so that issues and problems can be explored in in formal 
meetings and in subcommittees more likely to produce agreement. 
u.s. Proposals for Work of Conference 
Let me turn now to proposals regarding the work for the 
conference. 
The first proposal is that the conference work out and agree 
on an outline program of general and complete disarmament 
which can be included in the report due to the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission by June 1. The United States believes 
that, to fulfill this first objective, the initial aim of the conference 
should be to consolidate and expand the areas of agreement and 
to reconcile the differences between the United States and Soviet 
disarmament plans. This should result in working out a single 
program of general and complete disarmament which all could 
support. This agreed program might well take the form of a 
joint declaration which could be presented to the United Nations 
by all the states represented here. Such a program could be a 
framework for the treaty or treaties which would put the agreed 
total program into effect. 
But of course our aims must be more ambitious than this. We 
should begin at once to fill in the outline of the total program. 
Wherever possible we should seek specific commitments that 
could be put into effect without delay. This need not await agree-
ment on the outline as a whole. Nor should it impede the devel-
opment of an overall program. Wherever the common interest 
permits we can and should put into effect defined, specific steps 
as quickly as possible. 
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As a first step toward filling in the details of such a program 
the United States makes the following proposals: 
ONE: We propose that a cut of 30 percent in nuclear delivery 
vehicles and major conventional armaments be included in the 
first stage of the disarmament program. We propose that stra-
tegic delivery vehicles be reduced not only in numbers but also 
in destructive capability. We estimate that, given faithful co-
operation, this reduction might be carried out in 3 years. Similar 
reductions can, we believe, be achieved in each of the later stages. 
It is recognized, however, that, in the words of the agreed prin-
ciples, "All measures of general and complete disarmament should 
be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty 
could any State or group of States gain military advantage and 
that security is ensured equally for all." But agreement on such 
a reduction and the measures to carry it out would be a significant 
step forward. It would reverse the upward spiral of the arms 
race, replacing increases with decreases, and men could begin to 
gain freedom from the fear of mass destruction from such 
weapons. 
Two: The United States has proposed that early in the first 
stage further production of any fissionable material for nuclear 
weapons use be stopp~d. We propose now that thereafter the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. each agree to transfer in the first 
stage 50,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235 to nonweapons 
purposes. Such a move would cut at the heart of nuclear weap-
ons production. The initial transfers should be followed by addi-
tional transfers in the subsequent stages of the disarmament 
program. Resources now devoted to military programs could 
then be employed for purposes of peace. 
THREE: The United States proposes that the disarmament pro· 
gram also include early action on specific worldwide measures 
which will reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation, 
failure of communications, or surprise attack. These are meas-
ures which can be worked out rapidly. They are bound to in-
crease confidence. They will reduce the likelihood of war. 
We will be prepared to present concrete proposals for action 
in the following areas: 
A. Advance notification of military movements, such as major 
transfers of forces, exercises and maneuvers, flights of aircraft, 
as well as firing of missiles. 
B. Establishment of observation posts at major ports, railway 
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centers, motor highways, river crossings, and airbases to report 
on concentrations and movements of military forces. 
C. Establishment of aerial inspection areas and the use of 
mobil.e inspection teams to improve protection against surprise 
attack. 
D. Establishment of an International Commission on Meas-
ures To Reduce the Risk of War, charged with the task of 
examining objectively the technical problems involved. 
FOUR: The United States proposes that the participants in 
this conference undertake an urgent search for mutually accept-
able methods of guaranteeing the fulfillment of obligations for 
arms reduction. We shall look with sympathy on any approach 
which shows. promise of leading to progress without sacrificing 
safety. 
We must not be diverted from this search by shopworn efforts 
to equate verification with espionage. Such an abortive attempt 
misses the vital point in verification procedures. No govern-
ment, large or small, could be expected to enter into disarma-
ment arrangements under which their peoples might become 
victims of the perfidy of others. 
In other affairs, accounting and auditing systems are custom-
arily installed so that the question of confidence need not arise. 
Confidence grows out of know ledge; suspicion and fear are rooted 
in ignorance. This has been true since the beginning of time. 
Let me make this point clear: The United States does not ask 
for inspection for inspection's sake. Inspection is for no purpose 
other than assurance that commitments are fulfilled. The United 
States will do what is necessary to assure others that it has ful-
filled its commitments; we would find it difficult to understand 
why others cannot do the same. We will settle for any reason-
able arrangement which gives assurances commensurate with the 
risks. We do not ask a degree of inspection out of line' with the 
amount and kind of disarmament actually undertaken. Our aim 
is prudent prec ution, in the interest of the security of us all, 
and nothing else. 
We are prepared jointly to explore various means through 
which this could be done. It might be possible in certain instances 
to use sampling techniques in which verification could t.ake place 
in some predetern1ined fashion, perhaps in specific geographic 
areas, thus subjecting any violator of a disarmament agreement to 
a restraining risk of exposure, without maintaining constant Bnr-
veillance everywhere. This is, I repeat, one example of ways in 
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which recent progress in vel'lfication techniques can be adapted 
to the needs of participating states. vVe would hope that this 
conference would Inake a thorough study of every practicable 
method of effective verification. 
The four proposals I have just described are new and realistic 
examples of the specific measures which we contemplated in t.he 
first stage of the United States plan of September 25. We can 
recall that that plan had other specific proposals: 
That the Soviet Union and the United States reduce their force 
levels by many hundreds of thousands of men, to a total of 2,100,-
000 for each. 
That steps be taken to prevent states owning nuclear ,veapons 
from relinquishing control of such weapons to any nation not 
owning them. 
That weapons c~pable of producing mass destruction should 
not be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space. 
Call for Early Action on Testing 
FINALLY, we call for early action on a matter that should yield 
priority to none-the cessation of nuclear ,veapons tests. Here 
we stand at a turning point. If a treaty cannot be signed, and 
signed quickly, to do away with nuclear weapon testing with 
appropriate arrangements for detection and verification, there ",.ill 
be further tests and the spiral of competition will continue up-
ward. But if we can reach such an agreement, this development 
can be stopped, and stopped forever. This is why the United 
States and the United ICingdom have invited the Soviet Union 
to resume negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons tests under 
effective international controls. vVe shall press this matter here 
at Geneva' and make every reasonable effort to conclude an agree-
ment which can bring an end to testing. 
I had expected that a number of rep'resentatives might express 
here their regrets that the Soviet Union and the United States 
had resumed nuclear testing. But I had supposed that there was 
one delegation-that of the Soviet Union-which could not have 
found it possible to criticize the United States for doing so. 'The 
representative of the Soviet Union has spoken of the possible 
effect of United States weapons testing on this conference. The 
statement of agreed principles and this conference were born alnid 
the echoing roars of more than 40 Soviet nuclear explosions. A 
50-megaton bomb does not make the noise of a cooing dove. 
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Despite the Soviet tests of last autumn, nuclear weapons testing 
can stop-now and forever. 
The Soviet Union has spoken of its readiness to accept inspection 
of disarmament, though not of armament. We hope that it will 
agree that the total, permanent elimination of nuclear testing is 
disarmament and will accept effective international control within 
its own formula. 
Achieving Consensus on First Steps 
I have presented the United States proposals for early dis-
armament action in this conference. We shall have further sug-
gestions, and so, I am sure, will others. The conference will need 
to single out those points it regards as most susceptible of useful 
treatment, or most pressing in terms of the common danger, and 
to take them up at once. 
We believe that, as soon as agreement is reached on the specific 
measures to be included in the first stage, we can develop the 
specific steps for the second and third stages. In these stages 
further reductions of armaments will move hand in hand with 
the strengthening of international institutions for the maintenance 
of peace. 
Our plan of work must achieve what this conference is charged 
to do in the joint statement of agreed principles. Let us define 
the overall shape of the program. Let us develop in more detail 
the component parts which must be fitted together within the 
program. Let us do as much as we can as fast as we can. 
Let us, then, apply ourselves to the task of this conference 
soberly, systematically, and realistically. Let the need for dis-
armament provide the momentum for our work. Let us follo,v 
every promising path which might lead to progress. Let us with 
all deliberate speed reach a consensus on ,vhat can be done first 
and on what should be undertaken on a continuing basis. 
And let us not permit this conference, like its predecessors, to 
become frozen in deadlock at the start of its deliberations. Surely 
it need not do so. The obstacles to disarmament agreements-
the forces tending to divide us into rival aggregations of power-
might at long last begin to yield to the overriding and shared 
interest in survival which alone can unite us for peace. 
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u.s. Urges Soviet Union To Join in 
Ending Nuclear Weapon Tests 
BY DEAN RUSK 
I HAVE asked for the floor thib morning to comment on the in-terim report to which the chairlnan has just alluded. I do so 
because of the expressed wishes of a considerable number of for-
eign ministers to turn their attention urgently to this problem of 
the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests before the foreign 
ministers begin to return to their respective capitals. 
Let me say that the United States deeply regrets, in the words of 
the brief interim report, that it is not possible to report progress 
toward a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, 
because the United States regards and ,yin continue to regard a 
safeguarded end to nuclear testing as a major objective of its for-
eign policy. It also regards this as a major problem for considera-
tion by this conference. 
The reason is obvious. 'rhe moratorium which for almost 3 
years has halted nuclear weapon tests was wrecked by the sudden 
resumption of testing by the Soviet Union last September. The 
President of the United States has announced that the United 
States will resume testing in the atInosphere late in April, if by 
that time a safeguarded test ban treaty has not been signed. The 
reasons for this decision were set forth in his speech of March 2, 
which we are asking be circulated as a document of this conference. 
The time is short, and this conference will understandably wish 
to be sure that every possible effort is made to prevent a further 
intensification of the race to produce more and more deadly weap-
ons of mass destruction. 
I have asked for the floor this morning to comment on the 
interim report which the conference subcommittee on nuclear 
weapons testing has made to the conference. Unfortunately that 
interim report indicates that no progress has been made toward the 
conclusion of an effective treaty to prohibit nuclear weapon tests. 
The Soviet Union appears to be adanlantly opposed to any inter-
national system of detection and verification which could disclose 
clandestine testing and thus serve to place an obstacle in the way 
of a potential violator of a test ban treaty. 
We hope we have not yet heard the last word of the Soviet 
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Union on this matter, though I must confess that we see little 
ground for op6misnl at the InOlnent. 
Because of the United States Government's great desire to put 
an end to all tests of nuclear weapons, we are ,villing to sign a 
safeguarded treaty, with effective international controls, even 
though the Soviet Union conducted over 40 tests last fall. How-
ever, we are willing to ignore these tests only if, in return, we can 
be assured that testing will actually be halted. We will not again 
make our security subject to an unenforcible and uncontrolled 
moratorium, ,vhether this be in the fornl of a verbal pledge or a 
pseudotreaty such as the U.S.S.R. proposed on N ovenlber 28, 1961. 
What we need above all in this field is confidence and not fea.r, 
a basis for trust and not for suspicion. To get this is the major 
purpose of our insistence on effective international arrangements 
to insure that nuclear weapon tests, once outla,ved, do not, in fact, 
ever occur agam. 
You will remember that the abnosphere for agreements on 
disarmament questions was not too favorable in 1958, especially 
after the collapse of lengthy negotiations in London during much 
of 1957. 
Accordingly, in the search for a more promising approach to 
the issue of a nuclear test ban, the United States, the United 
Kingdonl, and the Soviet Union decided to try to resolve the tech-
nical questions first before proceeding to a consideration of politi-
cal questions. This path led to a conference in Geneva in July 
and August 1958 among the scientists of eight countries, i.e. of 
the three then existing nuclear powers plus France, Canada, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania. 
On August 21, 1958, these experts unanimously agreed on the 
details of a control systeln which would be technically adequate 
to monitor a treaty ending all tests of nuclear weapons. Before 
SepteInber -I, 1958, the recommendations of the scientists had 
been accepted in toto by the Governments of the United States, 
the United ICingdom, and the Soviet Union. Essentially these 
same technical provisions form the basis of the draft test ban 
treaty presented by the United States and United Kingdom on 
April 18, 1961. 
Technical Aspects of Controlling Test Ban 
I believe it would be helpful to review some of the technical 
aspects of controlling a test ban. 
The words "detection" and "identification" are the key to an 
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understanding of the teclmical aspects of verification. A great 
many methods have been devised by scientists to record the in-
nun1erable happenings of a geophysical nature which take place 
around us. Earthquakes are registered by seismographs; hydro-
acoustic apparatus records sounds in the oceans. 
I have mentioned these two particular types of instruments 
because they, along with various other devices, also happen to 
be capable of registering signals which are emitted by nuclear 
detonations. What we call detection is merely the capturing of 
these diverse signals. 
Detection, however, is only half of the story; in fact, it is rather 
less than half. The primary concern is to know exactly what 
has been recorded or detected. For example, the signal received 
on a seismograph from an underground nuclear explosion looks 
like the signals received on a seismograph from many types of 
earthquakes. Signals which may come from a small nuclear det-
onation in the atmosphere may be difficult to detect. In each case 
the overwhelming difficulty confronting any control system mon-
itoring a nuclear test ban is how to differentiate among the vari-
ous recordings or detected signals, how to tell which is a natural 
phenomenon and which is a nuclear explosion. 
This was exactly the issue that faced the scientists in Geneva 
in mid-1958. It is the very same issue that faces us on control 
today. The answer of the scientists was that, where doubt existed, 
the only way to clear up the mystery was to utilize some form 
of on-site inspection. This is still the only answer available to us. 
In regard to underground tests, except for quite large ones like 
the Soviet blast of February 2, 1962, the technical situation is 
unchallenged by anybody and was even readily admitted by the 
Soviet Government on November 28 last when it put forward its 
new test ban scheme based on existing monitoring systems. For 
these underground events which are detected but which cannot 
be identified by expert interpretation of the seismic recording, 
the only way to determine what has happened is to send an inves-
tigating team to the spot. The events could be earthquakes or 
secret nuclear tests. And there could be some hundreds of such 
events per year in the United States and the Soviet Union. 
There is no scientific method not involving inspection that can 
identify positively a seismic event as a nuclear explosion. If our 
Soviet colleagues have reason to believe otherwise, they should 
come forward with their new scientific evidence. 
This technical situation provides a further important reason 
for including the Soviet Union in the worldwide control-post 
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network. The spacing between the control posts in the Soviet 
Union should be exactly the same as it is in the rest of the world. 
In order to have the best chance to eliminate a seismic event 
from suspicion without conducting an inspection, that is, by means 
of the interpretation of the seismic recording itself by experts, 
it is essential to have readings from control posts on a global 
basis, including those within the United States and the U.S.S.R. 
Without instruments in the U.S.S.R.-one-sixth of the landmass 
of the globe-many more seismic events in that country become 
SUSpICIOUS. 
In connection ,vith atmospheric tests, the conclusive means for 
identifying the true nature of a detected event is to acquire a 
sample of the air near that event. If the event was manmade 
this will show up during a chemical analysis of the air sample. 
For medium and large atmospheric nuclear detonations, the radio-
active debris will become part of air masses that are certain to 
move beyond the boundaries of the country concerned. This 
method is not reliable, however, for small atmospheric tests. 
In recognition of this the 1958 scientists recommended the in-
stallation of air-sampling equipment at every control post. Even 
then they anticipated that in certain instances some question of 
identification would still remain, and for this they proposed the 
use of special aircraft flights conducted over the territory of a 
specific country to capture air samples. Naturally, to the extent 
that control posts within a country did not exist where radio-
active air sampling could take place, there would be just that 
much greater need of special air-sampling flights. 
Although American scientists have for the past several years 
been actively seeking new methods of detection and, even more, 
of identification of possible nuclear explosions, and although there 
are some promising avenues of investigation which may be proven 
in the next few years, the fact is that very little has · been dis-
covered up to date to justify any significant modification of the 
conclusions and recommendations of the Geneva scientists of 
1958. Soviet scientists essentially agreed with this at our last 
joint meeting with them on a test ban during May 1960 in Geneva. 
Therefore, when we contemplate the cessation of nuclear weapon 
tests by international agreement, we must still look to international 
control arrangements similar to those proposed in 1958 to give 
the world security against violations. But the faster we have 
tried to move toward the Soyiets in these matters, the faster they 
seem to move away from their earlier positions. 
The draft treaty which the United States and the United I(ing-
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dom proposed in April 1961 reflected the recommendations of the 
1958 experts. It also incorporated into its terms a large number 
of politIcal and organizational arrangements for the test ban con-
trol organization on which the three powers had already come to 
agreement at the test ban conference or which went far toward 
meeting previous Soviet demands. Eastern and vVestern nations 
were to have equal numbers of seats on the Control Commission, 
which also had places for nonalined nations, and there were de-
tailed provisions for an equitable division by nationality of the 
international staff, as the U.S.S.R: had sought. The fact that 
many of the administrative and organizational provisions for 
the future International Disarmament Organization, as set forth 
in the Soviet document tabled here on March 15, are similar to the 
provisions of the Anglo-American draft test ban treaty of last 
year demonstrates that the Soviet Union can have no serious ob-
jection to large portions of our proposal. 
No Basis for Fear of Espionage 
Indeed, when all is said and done, the fundalnental Soviet com-
plaint about the test ban control system to which it seemed to 
agree in 1958, 1959, and 1960, and which its own scientists had 
helped to devise, is that it would facilitate Western espionage 
against the Soviet Union. But the facts are otherwise. The pro-
posed system would not have any potential for any espionage 
which would be meaningful in terms of present-day military 
requirements. 
The truth is that under the United States-United I(ingdom 
draft treaty control posts in the U.S.S.R. would be iInmobile units 
with fixed boundaries. No site could be chosen for a control post 
in the U.S.S.R. without the specific consent of the Soviet Govern-
ment. No foreign personnel on the staff of any control post would 
have any official need to leave the boundaries of the post (except 
when entering and leaving Soviet territory), and it would be up 
to the Soviet authorities to decide whether such personnel should 
be permitted to leave the post. Within the post one-third of the 
technical staff and all of the auxiliary staff would be Soviet 
nationals, nominated by the Soviet Government. In these circum-
stances surely nothing taking place at the post could remain un-
known to the Soviet Government. 
The situation concerning on-site inspection teams would be 
equally devoid of espionage possibilities. The area to be inspected 
would be predetermined on the basis of seismographic recordings. 
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There would be no random selection of the geographic site. To 
get to the site of the inspection the teams would have to use trans-
port furnished by the Soviet Government. They could only carry 
specified equipment related to their immediate job. Although 
there would not be any Soviet national members of the inspection 
team, half of the team would be nationals of nonalined countries 
and the Soviet Government would be invited to assign as many 
Soviet observers as it wished to verify the activities of the inspec-
tion team. 
I should also stress that the size of the inspect able area would, 
in any event, be limited to the territory within a radius of about 
8 or, in some cases, 13 kilometers from the point, the so-called prob-
able epicenter, where the unidentified seismic event was presumed 
to have taken place. This radius would involve an inspectable 
area of 200 or, in some cases, 500 square kilometers. The Soviet 
Union has territory of over 21 million square kilometers. There-
fore it can readily be seen that, even if there were 20 inspections 
per year in the U.S.S.R. and even if each of these inspections 
operated within a 500-square-kilometer area, less than one-
twentieth of 1 percent of Soviet territory, i.e. less than one part 
in 2,000, could ever be subject to inspection in anyone year. 
Finally, no espionage would be feasible on the occasional special 
air-sampling flights which might take place over Soviet ten-itory. 
The plane and its crew would be Soviet, and Soviet Government 
observers could be on board. The only foreigners would be two 
staff technicians from the control organization \vho would manage 
the equipment taking the air samples and who would insure that 
the plane actually flew along the route previously prescribed. 
I have recounted these matters in some detail because it is easy 
to make generalized charges over and over again about the dangers 
of espionage in a test ban control system. 
It takes careful explanation to show why such charges are com-
pletely groundless, even though it stands to reason that the 
U.S.S.R., which was just as sensitive about espionage in 1958 as 
in 1961, would never have accepted such a control system in prin-
ciple in 1958 if it had then believed that the system could have had 
the slightest real espionage danger for the Soviet Union. 
It should be clear now that the explanation for Soviet behavior 
on the issue of a test ban must be sought elsewhere. There is no 
rational basis for Soviet concern about misuse of the control sys-
tem for espionage purposes. There is no scientific basis for the 
Soviet desire to abandon the still indispensable control system 
which was recommended by the scientists in 1958 and approved by 
the governments of the then-existing nuclear powers. There is no 
political basis for any of us to believe that a test ban is any less 
urgent now than it was in 1958 or that the benefits which it would 
bring in improving the international climate would be any less. 
U.S.S.R. Urged To Review Position 
My Government, therefore, is at a loss to understand the Soviet 
position unless it be that the U.S.S.R. has decided that it is still 
overwhelmingly important for it to be free to continue its nuclear 
weapon tests. This was what the Soviet Government said last 
September, when it referred to the tense international situation 
as a justification for its test resumption, and it may be that the 
U.S.S.R. feels a military need for another test series. If this is 
the case, then it is true that the easiest way for the Soviet Union 
to remain unhampered by a test ban treaty is to offer one which 
contains no provisions whatsoever for effective control and which 
the United States and United Kingdom could accept only at grave 
risk to their national security and to that of the free world. 
I cannot urge the Soviet Government too strongly to review 
its position and to return to the previously agreed basis of nego-
tiation, namely, the experts' recommendation of 1958. We ask 
the Soviet Union to cease its attempts to have the international 
community distort sound verification procedures to accommodate 
one state which is obsessed by a passion for secrecy . We ca~l 
upon the Soviet Union to enter into genuine negotiations in the 
three-nation subcommittee set up by this Committee to consider 
the test ban problem. 
There is today an interim report of this subcommittee. Rut, 
unfortunately, there are no grounds for encouragement. I should 
like to comment briefly on the events of the past few weeks whieh 
have led us to this point. 
Recent U.S. Proposals To Achieve Test Ban 
The President of the United States on March 2 stated in refer-
ring to our conference here that: 
... we shall, in association with the United Kingdom, present once 
again our proposals for a separate comprehensive treaty-with appropriate 
arrangements for detection and verification-to halt permanently the testing 
of all nuclear weapons, in every environment: in the air, in outer space, 
under ground, or under water. New modifications will also be offered in 
the light of new experience. 
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In fulfillment of this pledge the United States presented to the 
Soviet Union, first in an informal meeting on March 15 and this 
week in the subcommittee, ne,v proposals of the kind indicated. 
We have indicated clearly in both formal and informal discus-
sions that the United States is prepared to grant a point to which 
the Soviet Union has apparently attached great importance, 
nalnely, to drop the 4.75-degree threshold and to make the treaty 
from the outset complete in its coverage-banning from the be-
ginning all tests in the atmosphere, outer space, underground, and 
in the oceans. We will do this without increasing the number 
of inspections or the number of control posts in the Soviet Union. 
'Ve would seek, by common agreement, to allocate the quota of 
inspections in such a way that most would be conducted in a few 
areas of high seismicity and only a few would be allowable in 
a large region in the heart of the Soviet Union, where there are 
normally few seismic noises which would require investigation. 
These moves have been made possible by increased experience 
and increased scientific knowledge. But our experience has also 
shown the need for provisions for safeguarding other states 
against the consequences of preparations for testing. This would 
consist, in large part, of periodic declarations on the parts of heads 
of state that there will be no preparations for testing, and agreed 
rights to inspect a certain number of tin1es per year equal numbers 
of declared sites on each side. 
Experience has also shown the need for provisions to shorten 
the time spent before the beginning of the inspection process. 
This would primarily be a question of the way the Preparatory 
Commission functioned and agreement to cooperate in speeding 
up, by all possible means, the establishment of detection facilities, 
including temporary control posts. 
The United States has made clear that it still stands by its 
original treaty proposal of April 18, 1961, plus the amendments 
proposed in 1961, and will sign that treaty. It has also made 
clear that it is willing to negotiate along the lines I have described 
to update the treaty if the Soviet Union prefers. 
The response of the Soviet Union thus far has not given us any 
hope. The Soviet delegation has told us that the U.S.S.R. will 
not accept a treaty with or without the amendments we propose. 
vVe are still confronted with the unmistakable reversal of the 
Soviet position which took place a few months ago after the 
Soviet Union had for 4 years asserted its willingness to accept a 
controlled test ban agreement and after 17 articles and 2 im-
portant treaty annexes had been negotiated. The roadblock to 
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a cessation of tests is this reversal of the Soviet attitude. The 
U.S.S.R. was prepared to accept controls before the recent test 
series. Now, after 40 or more tests, it is not ready to do so. It 
is difficult for us to understand the reason. 
The problem cannot really be espionage. For over 2 years in 
the test ban conference, as I have outlined in detail, we negotiated 
arrangen1ents 'which would insure that the modest amount of 
control and inspection contemplated could not be misused for 
espionage purposes. 
The problem also cannot be that the verification system is overly 
burdensome. As I have said, the system which we worked out 
was directly based on the estimate of the minimum technical re-
quirements which was the product of an agreed analysis by Soviet 
and Western scientists. The technical basis for this system has 
never yet been challenged on scientific grounds by the Soviet 
Union. 
The U.S.S.R. now seems to be telling us that under existing 
circumstances the idea of international verification is wholly un-
acceptable in any form whatsoever. It seems to be telling us that 
verification is not even necessary-that it is an insult to request 
it, even though this is a measure of disarmament. Unnecessary ~ 
Merely necessary to end nuclear testing. It seems to be telling us 
that there can be no impartial investigation, even when there has 
been a signal recorded from within the Soviet Union and when 
it is impossible, without such an investigation, to ascertain whether 
the cause of the signal was a phenon1enon of nature or a man-
made nuclear explosion. 
We recognize that there are risks in any disarmament measure 
because no control system can give 100 percent certainty. But a 
study of our draft treaty with our proposed modifications ,vill 
indicate that the United States and United Kingdom have been 
willing to accept a very considerable degree of risk. However, 
we cannot move to a treaty which is based on no adequate controls 
at all but solely on pure faith. We do not ask the Soviet Union 
to trust the word of other nations, and other nations cannot be 
asked to trust the Soviet Union's word on matters of such far-
reaching significance. 
In President Kennedy's words of March 2, "We know enough 
now about broken negotiations, secret preparations, and the ad-
vantages gained from a long test series never to offer again an 
uninspected moratorium." The same could equally be said about 
an unverified treaty obligation such as the U.S.S.R. is now pro-
posIng. We do not intend to be caught again as we were in the 
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autumn of 1961, and there is no reason why we should have to be 
caught again by a unilateral Soviet decision to resume nuclear 
weapon tests. This is a risk to national and international security 
which the United States cannot and will not take. A test ban, 
or any disarmament measure, will be acceptable to us only when 
it is accompanied by adequate measures of verification. 
International Verification Essential 
In summary the essential element on which we must insist is 
that there be an objective international system for assuring that 
the ban against testing is being complied with. This means that 
there must be an international system for distinguishing between 
natural and artificial events. The April 18 treaty provided for 
such a system. Last week the U.S. and U.K. made some modifica-
tions of the proposed treaty in a way calculated to meet Soviet 
objections. These proposed modifications were rejected almost 
immediately by the Soviets on the grounds that international 
verification was not necessary. This refusal to accept any form 
of verification strikes very hard at our efforts .to guarantee the 
world against resumption of nuclear tests. The key element in 
the U.S. position is that there must be effective international veri-
fication of the obligations undertaken in any such treaty. 
Let there be no misunderstanding in this Committee. A nuclear 
test ban agreement can be signed in short order. There are no 
hidden difficulties; there are no mysterious obstacles in the way. 
No time-consuming negotiations need be required. The ground-
work has all been laid. Only one element is missing: Soviet will-
ingness to conclude an agreement. 
The United States will consider any proposal which offers effec-
tive international verification, but the United States cannot settle 
for anything less. 
We urge the Soviet Union to reconsider its attitude and join 
in putting an end to nuclear weapon testing-a total end, a per-
manentend. 
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The Initiative for Peace 
BY WILLIAM C. FOSTER 
I AM especially pleased to be with you today and in a few rno-
ments you will learn why. My good friend, Dr. E. A. J. 
Johnson, invited me to participate in this wide-ranging series of 
lectures on "The United States in a Changing World Environ-
ment" last June 30. It is a great credit to his keen perception in 
the area of foreign affairs that I am here today. At the time I 
received his invitation, the United States Arms Control and Dis-
armament Agency was not yet born and, obviously, I was not its 
director. 
The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was est.ablished 
by an Act of Congress on Septelnber 26, 1961, and I had the 
honor to be appointed its Director by President I(ennedy shortly 
thereafter. 
Since then, arms control and disarmament have occupied a 
fairly conspicuous position in the field of U.S. foreign policy. 
Certainly its ultimate objectives are ideally suited to the title of 
this lecture series-"The United States in a Changing World 
Environment. " 
While talking to a gathering of college students recently, I 
remarked about the need for some new timing systerns for arms 
control and disarmament. I was groping for ,vords, and perhaps 
I still am, but what I suggested was that we need new clocks-
faster for technologies, slower for humanities. 
For, of course, what we are really talking about when we 
negotiate for arms control and, ultimately, arms elimination is 
nothing less than a radical change in the political structure of 
the world. The United States has proposed to the Soviet Union, 
and indeed to all the countries participating in the disannament 
talks in Geneva, an orderly, progressive, step-by-step reduction 
in arms. . I will go into these proposals in .more detail in a 
moment, but there is a point I wish to make now. It i"s simply 
this: assuming that it is agreed to move down the road in these 
stages in which dependence on national armies is gradually 
eliminated and replaced with reliance on international agencies-
the International Court of Justice, for example-fundamental 
and basic changes in the political structure of relationship be-
tween nations are certainly involved. 
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The question of moment is whether we can really face up to 
such changes. 
We are under immense compulsion to move toward disarma-
ment, for we know that an arms race is a means to a terrible 
end. 
But, equally, we are under life or death compulsion to disarm 
only in concert with others and without sacrifice of our security. 
The Dilemma 
This is the dilemma: the necessity to keep our defenses strong 
in a world threatened by Messianic communisln and the necessity 
to begin the dismantling of the world's towering war machinery. 
To many, these twin needs are hopelessly contradictory. In this 
conviction they embrace either one or the other of the two courses 
of action. But the nature of the world today requires us to 
respond to both of these needs simultaneously. To build national 
policy on only one is to court disaster. But national policy con-
ceived in response to both offers the most promising hope of 
avoiding a catastrophic collision. 
And if avoidance of collision looks difficult, let me say that in 
my opinion it is even more difficult than it appears. Henry Wris-
ton, a distinguished educator and thoughtful American, points 
out that the charter of UNESCO declares that wars begin in 
the hearts of men. However, as he says, many of the things for 
which men have fought lie deep beneath the thought processes; 
they are not rational at all. 'Vars actually begin not in the minds 
of men but in their hearts, using "hearts" in the old-fashioned 
or Biblical sense as meaning the passions, the will, the sundry 
drives for which the psychoanalysts have such murky nomen-
clature. 
After all, it was only-should I say only-Helen's beautiful 
face that once launched a thousand ships. 
The serious point is that it is not enough in our efforts at arms . 
control and disarmament to rely on what is rational and reason-
able; we must have an eye open also for what is irrational and 
'Unreasonable. I will not belabor the points. In our reasonable 
minds we know today Inankind has in vivid fact already invented 
something pretty close to Herman Kahn's "Doomsday Machine." 
I appreciate that I am before a sophisticated audience today. 
Most of you have read the reports that one Polaris submarine 
carries more explosive power than all the bombs dropped by 
both sides during World War II, including the two atomic bomb~. 
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Such statements are hard to accept ,vith a full conlprehension. 
I myself have spent many years in this field-at the Pentagon 
in two wars; as a member of special commissions examining what 
modern wea pons can do, and also w hat they could do to our 
civilian population; as an executive in industry engaged in de-
signing and making advanced weapons; and now in my present 
job of pondering how we can safely lay down the weapons. De-
spite this experience extending back over the better part of 20 
years, I still find it hard to grasp fully that it is almost possible 
now for us humans to press the total "destruct" button. Yet this 
is the fact; the Russians know it. In our rational moments we 
face up to it and agree to talk about putting some controls on the 
button, even abolishing it. Don't, I plead with you, scoff at the 
Geneva meetings or give way to a certain "what's the use" feeling. 
For if you conclude that all efforts at arms control and dis-
armament are useless, you may find yourself accepting the fal-
lacious belief that nuclear war is a practical solution to the 
settlement of disputes and the attainment of international politi-
cal objectives. 
No responsible leader in any country of the world that I know 
of today believes that nuclear war is the solution to anything, 
except that it probably would solve a great many human problems 
by dissolving the humans. It is, I agree, ironic that it is the 
catastrophic nature of nuclear war rather than the improvement 
of human relationships that provides us with the opportunity 
and the utter necessity to choose peace or death, but such is the 
fact. 
Given that fact, what are e doing about it ~ 
The answer is that under the initiative of President Kennedy, 
and with the authority of Congress, we in the U.S. have set up 
the Agency of which I spoke, the United States Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. It represents the first time in human 
history, as far as I can ascertain, that a government has set up 
a full-fledged independent agency to devote its total efforts to 
seeking a responsible reduction in arms and seeking ultinlate 
disarmalnent. Obviously, such steps will never be taken by an 
undefeated nation unless there is an accompanying reduction in 
the danger, so we are, as .our enabling legislation states, "an agency 
for peace." 
Although there has been a great deal written, and more said, 
about the general principles of arms reduction, it has remained 
for our Agency actually to work up a detailed plan for ,vhat we 
believe is a safe start. In doing this work we kept in mind the 
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statements of the Russians so that our plan might, at least in 
principle, take into account what they have in the past said they 
wanted. 
Our Agency came into being only last September. Our first 
task was to seek out and bring onto our staff individuals especially 
competent in the fields we needed to explore in developing a con-
sidered plan. For example, we obviously require scientific talents 
that not only know the various and relative weapons on our 
side and the Soviet side but who also enjoy an expertness in the 
complicated field of detection and verification. 
We needed experts in diplomacy, men who have dealt with 
the Communists in strategic areas. We needed men who were 
familiar with the Soviet economy and the pressures it is under. 
In short, we needed intelligence and experience of the highest 
order. 
And we needed something more. We needed men of dedica-
tion. We needed men who so competently understood the facts 
of life in the world of today that they were willing, indeed glad, 
to open their minds to concepts and procedures never experi-
mented with before. We needed practical idealists. We needed 
men of the great tradition of Western civilization, which is to 
say men of practical optimism, not pessimists. Not every man 
is suited to be a "peace-monger." It requires a special type. I 
have emphasized to those invited to join the Agency that if they 
don't believe in the aims of our Agency, they will do everybody 
a favor by not joining. 
Now this doesn't mean that we looked for the starry -eyed. The 
other day I was called up to the office of a certain Senator, and 
there I was greeted by a group of indignant women. They did 
not want us to put down one rifle until we were absolutely certain 
that the Russians were doing likewise. They seemed a bit 
startled when I told them I couldn't agree more. "Ve are not, 
repeat not, interested in tmilateral disarmament. We are not 
disciples of passive resistance. 
What we do believe in was carefully stated in the proposals 
we laid before the Disarmament Conference in Geneva on April 
18. There are three principles: 
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1. Disarmament must be balanced so that no state gains a mili-
tary advantage. 
2. Compliance with disarmament obligations should be verified. 
3. The United Nations should be progressively strengthened 
so that it can enforce peaceful settlement of differences. 
Three Stages in Disarmament Plan 
Under our plan, disarmament \vould proceed in three stages. 
~fajor armaments would be reduced in three equal annual steps 
of Stage I by 10 percent each, a total of 30 percent. Agreed arms 
\vould be disposed of under the cognizance of a new U.N. agency, 
the International Disarmament Organization. In the first half 
of step one of Stage I, we might, for example, release some B-52's 
while the Russians would deposit an equal number of Bisons 
and Bears. In the second half of step one of this plan, the IDO 
\vould destroy or convert to peaceful uses the deposited weapons. 
The IDO \vould verify that the armaments were thus dealt with 
and that retained arms did not eX'ceed the pre-agreed levels. 
These steps would proceed in the same fashion throughout 
Stage I. 
Production of new items would be restricted and could only 
be done at a rate such that remaining levels by numbers and by 
some agreed measure of destructive capability would be lower. 
In other words, the level would be reduced on a net basis during 
each step of Stage I, but not necessarily in each type of weapon. 
As to uniformed men, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would reduce 
to 2.1 million each, and other major, or as we say "specified," 
countries would be limited to the same. Smaller countries would 
be limited to 100,000 men or one percent of their population, 
whichever was higher. . 
. Fissionable material production would be halted for weapons, 
and agreed quantities would be transferred to peaceful uses. 
These are some of the significant elements in Stage I of our 
disarmament plan. Before speaking of the second stage, I think 
it is important to note here the principles which we believe should 
apply in making the transition from Stage I to Stage II and 
from Stage II to Stage III. Because disarmament goes to the 
very heart of a nation's security, I am certain I need not emphasize 
how essential it is to proceed with care and deliberation. Stem-
ming from this awareness is our belief that the transition from 
one stage of the disarmament process to another must be a moment 
of pause and consideration to insure that all disarmament actions 
of the previous stage have in fact been carried out and that the 
nations are ready to move into the next stage of the program. 
This should not be taken. as an indication of any unwillingness 
on the part of the United States to go the full length of the 
road leading to general and complete disarmament in a peaceful 
'vorld. But let us be honest enough to face the fact that it is 
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totally unrealistic to agree to speed down this road 'without slow-
ing and even stopping periodically to be sure ,ve are still on the 
right road. 
Stage II-and I aln skipping very lightly over these-would 
also be of 3 years' duration. Armed forces would be cut 50 per-
cent below the Stage I levels. Nuclear weapons and nuclear 
stockpiles would be further reduced by the saIne percentage.. 
Agreed military bases and facilities 'wherever the.y were located 
would be disInantled or converted to peaceful uses in an agreed 
sequence. The strengthening of peacekeeping arrangements be-
gun in Stage I would continue. This would include acceptance 
of the cOInpulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of J us-
tice, the establishment of the United Nations Peace Force, and 
further strengthening of IDO to insure its ability to verify. 
Stage III would be of 'lmdetermined duration-3 years, 5 years, 
10 years, or more, but it would be the period in which the objec-
tive of what we in the trade call "G and C," meaning general 
and complete disannament, ,vould become a fact. 
Inspection and Verification 
The questions usually put to me by Alnericans don't seem to 
deal so much with broad principles as they do with details. For 
example, I ,am sometimes asked, and often 'with a touch of horror 
in the voice, ,,~hether we would start disarmament without pre-
linrJ.inary inspection or verification. The answer is that the 
process of disarmament nlust be silnultaneous ,vith the procedure 
of inspection. We do not seek inspection for its own sake. What 
,ve ask is that a disarmament conlnlitment undertaken be guaran-
teled by more than a promise. Given the abyss of distrust which 
divides the Communist and non-Communist worlds, "Te cannot be 
expected to accept the "rord of the Soviet Union that they are, in 
fact, following through on a pledge to destroy certain armanlents. 
'rhe reverse of this is also true. We do not ask the Soviets to 
accept our verbal pledge. "'\¥" e are prepared to subInit appro-
priate inspection of whatever disarmalnent measures are under-
taken. 
But there is another essential to this whole question of verifica-
tion of disarmament commitments. It lies in the fact that it 
is not the arms which are destroyed ,vhich we must fear-it is 
the arms that remain or that are produced contrary to agreement 
that pose the real danger. The Secretary of State has used the 
phrase: "Secrecy and disarmament are incompatible." This gets 
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to the very core of the verification probleln. We cannot place 
the security of our country and the free w'orld at the 111ercy of 
actions taken behind a curtain of secrecy. Thus a logical ex-
tension of the principle of adequate assurance that arms are, in 
fact, being destroyed is the corollary that whatever residual 
levels of annaments are agreed upon shall not be exceeded. Let 
l11e use a simple illustration to make this point, for it is vital to 
an understanding of the whole problem of verification. 
Suppose you and your neighbor, after years of quarreling, have 
each alnassed a rather fon11idable collection of pistols and swords 
for protection should your disputes flare into violence. One day 
you both decide that it is foolish to maintain such an expensive 
hoard of firearms and cutlery and you both agree to destroy all 
of the s,Yords and half of the pistols each possesses. The first 
question that must be asked after such a verbal bargain is struck 
is silnply this: How many swords and pistols does each of you 
possess ? You may say you have 100 swords and 100 pistols. 
Therefore, under the terms of your agreement you ,vould offer 
up 100 swords and 50 pistols for destruction. But suppose your 
neighbor doesn't believe you. Suppose he says: "I know you 
have 200 swords and 100 pistols." Hovv is such a wrangle to be 
settled? By claim and counterclail11? By verbal declarations 
and denials? Of course not. The only way is for each party to 
permit the other to verify by some forms of direct observation 
or inspection that the declared total of swords and pistols is the 
actual total. . Thus, when the verbal agreen1ent to destroy 100 
swords and 50 pistols is made, the other party will know with 
certainty that only 50 pistols actually remain-not 500 or 5,000. 
I assure you that I have not digressed with this little story 
of swords and pistols-however incongruous such examples may 
seem when compared with rockets and missiles. The hard fact 
of the n1atter is that this problem-the problem of verification 
of rmnaining armalnents-is a very fundamental difference be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union today. I am not 
suggesting that the analogy I have offered is wholly applicable 
to the problems of disarmament and inspection involving nation 
states. But it does illustrate one of the fundamental elements 
of the verification problem, and I 'would be less than candid if 
I did not admit to you that it is a problem which must be solved 
before we can hope to achieve Ineaningful disarmament progress. 
The next question is almost always : "Now, as a practical n1an, 
just 'what are the chances, do you think, for anything of this 
sort? Aren't we 'wasting time and energy that might otherwise 
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be used on arms production ~ Have we time for this frustrating 
Geneva stuff~ Does anybody really think the Soviets want 
disarmament? " 
Well, those are core questions, certainly. I'm glad I prefaced 
these remarks with the statement that, if we are to move down 
this path, "fundamental and basic changes in the political s.truc· 
ture of relationship between the nations are involved." 
Pressures for Disarmament 
But there are pressures building up behind disarmament. I 
mention one in the fact that modern \var is so threatening to 
human life that rational men cannot press the "destruct" button. 
Another pressure is the lTIOunting costs of the arms race. This 
is already affecting, and I think acutely affecting, the Russian 
ability to produce sufficient food, to say nothing of consumer goods. 
It is not a good, or safe, posture for a Russian Government to 
be in the posture of denying sufficient food to its people. I, for 
one, place emphasis on the probable increasing pressure \vithin 
Russia for relief from the burden. Proposals such as we have 
made, with their provision of safety and ,vorld participation, 
will have their effect. They offer alternatives; they offer room 
for negotiation. I believe they ,vill have their appeal and their 
effect. 
A final pressure, of course, is world opinion. In a nuclear war 
there really can be no neutrals. The effects of nuclear war can 
. be universal. Certainly today the dread is universal. 
Witn~ss for yourselves the concern about resumption of nuclear 
testing. And while the United States will always be responsive 
to the pressures of world opinion, we cannot let it be the don1inant 
factor in decisions affecting our national security. 'Ve have 
resumed testing only with great reluctance and because we ,vere 
forced .to do so by Russian refusal to abide by her promised 
suspension. Her broken promise was evidenced by last fall's series 
of tests. IIowever, this demand of the vlorld for an end to 
testing will in time, I believe, have its effect and bring the Rus-
sians to tie realization that their o,Yn security and welfare can · 
only benefit from an end to the testing of nuclear weapons. 
I would be less than candid if I did not confess SOlne disap-
pointment with the course and pace of events at the Geneva 
meetings thus far. The Soviet response to our detailed proposals 
has not been as thoughtful as I had hope-d, but on the positive 
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side they did raise son1e specific points. First, they objected to 
the open end on time for completion of the third or final stage. 
They also said it was unfair to ask them to give up certain long-
range rockets while we still held bases that could reach them 
from shorter range. 
I won't attenlpt to pass judgment on such points here, but 
the important fact is that we are all still in Geneva, talking 
and negotiating over these and other points, and as the pressures 
build, I believe-I fervently hope-we shall find ways of moving 
together to reverse the arms race. At least I feel that we have 
accomplished something to date, even if it is only to begin to 
search out for discussion the ways and means of making a start. 
This is acting as rational men should act, and while there is 
reason, there is hope. 
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The New Search for Disarmament-
Geneva 1962 
BY ARTHUR H. DEAN 
A LTHOUGH I am 'well acquainted with a. number of other parts of Switzerland as a result of many trips to Geneva over 
the years to take part in international negotiations, this is my 
first visit to the thriving and charming city of Ziirich. It is par-
ticularly pleasant and auspicious that the occasion for this initial 
encounter should be an invitation from your association, the 
Swiss Friends of America, a societ.y which has endured for over 
40 years. 
The name of your group itself seenlS a most happy choice, 
because it confirms the fact that, ,vhile Switzerland and its people 
have nothing except friends in America, the reverse is reci pro-
cally true, I am sure, over here. 
Indeed, if all nations enjoyed the excellent Hlutual relations 
similar to those of the United States and Switzerland, our 
disarmament conference in Geneva "'ould probably be unnecessary. 
In any event, even if it 'were still necessary, it 'would be almost 
sure to reach rapid agreement. Unfortunately, the mutual re-
lations bet-ween some of the countries represented in our negotia-
tions are not as good as Swiss-American relations, and this C0I11-
plicates our task in Geneva. 
1Ve ealIDot, of course, overlook the fact that the 18-Nation 
Disarnlalllent Conference is not proceeding in isolation fronl the 
world but in the most intimate connection with it. Indeed, its 
,vork is addressed to political, nlilitary, and psyehological problellls 
,vhich are po,verful and acutely sensitive factors in the existing 
international situation. 
The proposals of the various participating nations impinge 
directly on these sensitive factors, and the reaction by other menl-
bel'S of the 18-N ation Committee to such proposals is frequently 
derived fronl the broader context of world affairs-from con-
siderations of mistrust and suspicion, danger and risk, advantage 
and disadvantage, as well as from hopes and ideals. 
We know that the greatest concentration of military forces has 
taken place in North America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. 
The focal point for this concentration is, in many ,vays, Germany. 
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Our conference cannot, therefore, forget the interrelationship 
between the division of Gernlany generally, including the Berlin 
crisis specifically, and the possibility of progress on disarlnament. 
I do not wish to suggest either that disarmament is dependent 
on a German settlement or that a German settlement must await 
disarmament. 
We have been negotiating and will continue to negotiate with 
the Soviet Union quite separately on these two issues, as well as 
other problems. However, we must recognize that disarmament 
requires the cleveloplnent of at least limited amoun'ts of trust 
bet'ween East and 'Vest, and that the inlplementation of dis-
armalnent cannot proceed without a considerable degree of 
cooperation. 
In contrast to this, the growth of international tension which 
accompanies such crises as the Soviet Union has manufactured 
around Berlin makes the growth of East-West confidence and 
collaboration much more difficult. Thus it is apparent that, even 
without any formal link bet,veen international political problems 
and disarmament, there is bound to be a connection between them 
in the minds of the heads of government and foreign ministers 
who direct national policies on all of these matters. 
Having established this general framework in which our con-
ference must carryon its deliberations, I should now like to leave 
political problems to others and concentrate on disarnlament efforts 
themselves. 
The Objective at Geneva 
Frankly, in spite of my daily preoccupation with the affairs 
of our conference, I still remain in awe of the objective which 
we have set before ourselves in Geneva. We are not primarily 
discussing measures to calnl the international scene or to facilitate 
partial disa.rlnalnent, a.lthough there is some of this. Our main 
attention is directed tow'ard achieving the total disarmament of 
all nations for all tinle, except for the retention of linlited internal 
security forces inside each country and for the maintenance of 
a United Nations Peace Force. 
It staggers the imagination to think of great states without 
armies, to contelnplate the abolition of nuclear weapons, delivery 
vehicles for nuclear weapons, armaments, war budgets, weapons 
factories, general staffs, and all military training. Yet our aim 
in Geneva is to bring all of this to an end everywhere. 
59 
Because this goal is so far-reaching, because it cuts so deeply 
into the pattern of everyday human experience, great skepticism 
exists, I know, about whether the 18-Nation Committee can really 
be serious in its work. People inevitably ask whether we are not 
all engaged in a tremendous propaganda show in which no one 
expects significant progress but in which each side is trying to 
blacken the reputation of the other. 
I cannot, of course, speak for what other participating states 
may believe or intend. But as far as the United States is con-
cerned, we are at Geneva because we want to get on with the 
job. We have carefully examined the great problems and diffi-
culties of disarmament, but we have also thought long and hard 
about the alternatives to disarmament. On this basis, in this 
comparison, there cannot be any doubt about the preferable course. 
Disarmament wins hands down. 
We know-and we think that the Soviet Union agrees in this-
that armaments and the arms race cannot provide security in the 
long run. They cannot lead to a healthy international atmosphere, 
to a world free froIl).. fear and suspicion, to a planet devoting all 
of its human and economic resources to the maximum development 
of living standards everywhere. .' 
Indeed, if the armed forces of the 'world should ever be un-
leashed for a nuclear conflict, the . physical devastation and the 
moral degradation of the human spirit would be without parallel 
in history. 
Our objective, therefore, is world sanity and enhanced national 
security through disarmament. The present military and political 
alliances of the United States are essential because they provide 
us and our allies with a degree of security which we would 
otherwise not have under existing international conditions, when 
there is no disarmament. What we want to do is to move from 
this situation of partial and imperfect security for civilization 
and our way of life, which we hold dear, to the far more safe 
and sound conditions which can be attained under general and 
complete disarmament. 
As we know all too well, this is easier to set forth as a goal 
than to translate into a practical program for action. N everthe-
less, we are attempting to do just that in Geneva. Fortunately, 
we did not begin our labors on March 14 without careful advance 
preparation, and this should have a most important bearing 
upon our chances for ultimate success. 
The 18-N ation Conference is the first international meeting, 
at least since the end of the Second World 1Var, which is ex-
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plicitly concerned with total disarmament. It has not been so 
in the past. For example, one of the key questions at the 10-
Nation Disarmament Conference which met in Geneva for 4 
months in 1960 was whether the objective should be defined as 
total disarmament or partial disarmament. All previous con-
ferences and United Nations meetings on disarmament frankly 
addressed themselves" only to partial measures in limited fields. 
Now this problem is settled. 
Agreement on Principles 
And, what is even more significant, bilateral negotiations be-
tween the United States and Soviet Union from June through 
September 1961 produced an agreement on eight major principles 
for general and complete disarmament. These principles define 
the scope of disarmament, describe some of the procedures for 
carrying out disarmament fairly and sensibly, acknowledge that 
effective international control must accompany every disarma-
ment step, and provide for the strengthening of mternational 
peacekeeping machinery at the saIne time as disarmament proceeds. 
The existence of these principles, which were approved unani-
mously last fall by the United Nations General Assembly, has 
meant that the 18-Nation Conference was enabled to start im-
mediately at a more advanced stage of work than would otherwise 
have been possible. We have been given the framework or agenda 
for the conference. Our job is to devise the all-important details. 
It will be useful to list some of the chief subjects with which 
we must now deal. First, we must work out a disarmament plan 
which gets all nations from their present state of being 100 
percent armed to a future state of being 100 percent disarmed 
except for small internal security forces. The plan must include 
measures that cover every aspect of abolishing the military 
establishments of states. But it must define those measures and 
work out their timing and sequence in such a way that no state 
gains a military advantage over another state during the dis-
armament process. 
Second, we must insure that whatever disarmament plan is 
finally agreed on is carried out by all signatory states in the 
prescribed manner and in the fixed time period. To do this, we 
shall have to create an International Disarmament Organization 
to verify what is actually taking place on the implementation of 
disarmament measures in each country. 
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We already know from past experience that substantial politi-
cal and organizational problems will have to be faced in creating 
this organization in such form that it can operate effectively and 
impartially in all countries while still satisfying all states ·that it 
will be a truly intern8ltional instrument and not predominantly 
the agency of anyone group of states. 
Besides this, on the technical and scientific level we also know 
that there will be many practical difficulties in drawing up sound 
control measures. It is, of course, not too hard to verify the 
destruction of particular weapons or to confirm that some arms 
factory has actually been shut down. . However, this does not 
solve the problem of making certain ·th8lt weapons which should 
have been destroyed have not been retained in secret and hidden. 
It does not tell us how to arrange matters so that a factory which 
produces rockets for space exploration purposes is not secretly 
producing similar rockets for intercontinental ballistic missiles. 
The same difficulties of control exist in regard to the output of 
factories producing fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, 
such as the nuclear generation of electric power. 
Maintaining Peace Without Armies 
Third, we must devise practical measures for maintaining in-
ternational peace and security when national armies are no 
longer available to furnish the traditional basis of international 
politics. This involves efforts on two fronts. Fir8t, strengthen 
international machinery, which must be strengthened for settling 
disputes by peaceful means, through the United Nations and 
otherwise. Secondly, we must see to it that if any st3lte does 
attack another, there will be in existence a sufficiently strong 
international peace force under effective command to suppress 
such a thre3lt to the peace. 
Both the United States and Soviet Governments have addressed 
themselves to these problems by means of relatively detailed 
disarmament plans which their delegations have tabled in Geneva. 
Many other details still remain to be filled in for each plan, 
but, not surprisingly, major differences in content and approach 
are already apparent, even though both nations have subscribed 
to the same final disarmament objective. 
The United States plan envisages three stages for achieving 
total disarmament. The time periods for the first and second 
stages are fixed at 3 years each, while the time period for the 
third and last stage remains to be worked out during the course 
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of the negotiations. Our program is thus for a period of 6 
years, plus some as yet undetermined additional number of years. 
The basic philosophy of the American proposal is: first, to halt 
the arms race in its tracks by preventing a further upward spiral; 
next, to begin squeezing down existing armament levels by bal-
anced reductions all across the board; and, finally, to complete 
the total liquidation of military establishments. 
Throughout this process we provide for a gradual increase in 
the degree to which each state will be subject to international 
inspection and control. 
We also envisage the expanded use of the Internatio:p.al Court 
of Justice, a firmer adherence by all states to rules of peaceful 
international conduct, and agreement on effective arrangements 
for staffing, equipping, and using the new United Nations Peace 
Force. 
To give a few more details, the United States plan proposes 
that the vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons, and all other 
armaments except the nuclear weapons themselves, should be cut 
30 percent in the first stage, 35 percent more in the second stage, 
and eliminated entirely in the third stage. 
The production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons 
would be stopped in the first stage, half of the stockpiled weapons 
themselves would be destroyed in the second stage, and the rest 
in the third stage. The production of all other arms would be 
severely limited in the first stage and ended at the start of the 
second stage. 
Armed forces would be cut to a level of 2,100,000 men each 
for the Soviet Union and United States in the first stage, to 
1,050,000 in the second stage, and to zero, except for small internal 
security and U.N. Peace Force contingents, in the third. Similar 
reductions in all of the foregoing categories would also have to 
be applied to other militarily significant powers in the second 
stage and to all states in the third stage. 
The Soviet Plan 
The Soviet plan also consists of three stages, but the total 
time period for implementation is fixed at about 4 years. 
The U.S.S.R. proposes that all vehicles for delivering nuclear 
weapons and all foreign bases be liquidated in the first stage. 
The production of such.delivery vehicles would cease. The armed 
forces of the United States and Soviet Union would, at the same 
time, be cut to 1,700,000 men, and conventional armaments would 
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be reduced accordingly. Under the Soviet plan, nothing would be 
done in the first stage in regard to the production of fissionable 
material or nuclear weapons. 
The second stage of the Soviet program envisages the total 
elimination of nuclear weapons, a cut in armed forces to one 
million men, further cuts in conventional armaments stockpiles, 
and the cessation of 'armaments produ~tion by the end of the 
second stage. 
The third stage would see the total elimination of remaining 
armaments and armed forces except for limited police contingents 
to remain for internal security needs. 
The Soviet plan envisages the application of control and veri-
fication procedures to what it calls measures of disarmament. 
This means control over the specific arms destroyed, over the 
particular men demobilized, and over the factories designated 
to be closed down. 
It apparently excludes control over agreed levels of retained 
weapons and armed forces in stages one and two, as well as over 
factories continuing production. It also does not appear to pro-
vide for inspection in a country to search out armaments which 
may have been hidden in violation of the treaty, except, possibly, 
until after the end of the third stage, when total disarmament 
will have been achieved. In the meantime, the reduction in arms 
would have to proceed in part on faith alone without verification 
and inspection. 
With regard to peacekeeping arrangements, the Soviet plan ad-
vocates reliance upon a somehow vaguely strengthened United 
Nations but does not specify any other instrumentalities. The 
eventual U.N. Peace Force, to come into being at the end of 
stage three, would consist of agreed police contingents from var-
ious states operating under a troika-type command of Eastern, 
Western, and neutral nation representatives and called into action 
only by Security Council decision, on which, as you ·know, the 
permanent members have the power of veto. 
The current debates of the IS-Nation Conference are actually 
directed at these two plans, which I have presented only in very 
sketchy outline. . 
U.S.-U.S.S.R. Differences 
Each side is finding that there is much to criticize and to study 
in the plan of the other. 
The Soviet delegation says that the United States plan is to 
be stretched out over too long a period, the end of which has not 
yet been fixed. The U.S.S.R. claims that the 30 percent American 
cut in most armaments in the first stage is grossly inadequate 
and will not eliminate the threat of nuclear war to the same extent 
as the Soviet first stage cut of 100 percent in nuclear delivery 
vehicles. 
The Soviet. delegation is very critical of the absence of any 
reference to the reduction of foreign military bases in the first 
stage of the U.S. program. 
Moreover, the U.S. is said to be demanding too much control 
over the Soviet Union at too early a stage in the disarmament 
process, especially the right to verify Soviet adherence to agreed 
levels of forces and armaments and the right to search Soviet 
territory for hidden weapons. 
Amb~sador Zorin of the Soviet Union has also criticized the 
proposed American force cut to 2,100,000 men in the first stage, 
as against the Soviet proposal for a cut which would go 400,000 
men deeper. 
For its part, the United States believes that the Soviet scheme 
for a total elimination of delivery vehicles in the first stage, ac-
companied by the liquidation of all foreign bases, would cause a 
grave strategic imbalance in the world, which the more gradual 
across-the-board reductions of the American plan would avoid. 
We feel that the Soviet plan is most imprecise about the nature 
of the cuts in conventional armaments and in their production 
in the first and second stages. We are disturbed by a lack of 
Soviet willingness to join with us in first stage studies of control 
measures for complicated stage two and three measures to liquidate 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. We are also convinced 
that 4 years is too short a period for carrying out general and 
complete disarmament jn view of the great international changes 
which will accompany such disarmament. 
The United States also feels that the Soviet plan does not 
come to grips with control and inspection problems. It seems to 
us that, behind Soviet claims that broader inspection measures 
would mean Western espionage inside the U.S.S.R., there is an un-
willingness to recognize that extensive controls are necessary to 
substitute for nonexistent confidence between East and West that 
either side will honestly fulfill its disarmament obligations. 
Finally, we do not go along with the Soviet concept that the 
eventual United Nations Peace Force will consist of only police 
contingents, will operate under a three-bloc type command, which 
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would require unanimity in -the issuance of commands, and will be 
usable only if no permanent member of the Security Council 
vetoes its employment. 
As of this time, our debates in Geneva are continuing on 
all of these points, and on many more. Noone can now foresee 
what the outcome will be. Quite clearly, agreement will be 
possible only if we can iron out the fundamental differences 
between the two main disa~ament plans in the course of gen-
uine give-and-take negotiation. Perhaps the amount of progress 
toward a settlement of the Berlin crisis and other East-West 
issues may have something, or even very much, to do with progress 
in disarmament. Perha ps other considerations of Soviet domestic 
policy or Sino-Soviet relations are equally or more important. 
In the meantime we hope to proceed with our work, to persevere 
without falter,lng. 
Now at last we have started the indispensable process of talking 
about general and complete disarmament. 
However long it takes and however much it may try our pa-
tience, I have the profound conviction that we must not, we cannot 
~fford to stop our efforts to bring about general and complete 
disarmament. 
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List of organizations before which the addresses and state-
ments were made, together with the dates and places-
THE CALL FOR LEADERSHIP. Address made by John J. Mc-
Cloy at the International Industrial Conference sponsored 
by the National Industrial Conference Board and Stan-
ford Research Institute at San Francisco on Se.ptember 
11, 1961. 
W ORKING TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT WAR. Statement made 
by Adlai E. Stevenson in Committee I (Political and Se-
curity) at the United Nations at New York on Novem-
ber 15, 1961. 
U.S. OUTLINES INITIAL PROPOSALS OF PROGRAM FOR GENERAL 
AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT. Statement made by Dean 
Rusk at the second plenary meeting of the 18-N ation Dis-
armament Committee at Geneva on March 15, 1962. 
U.S. URGES SOVIET UNION To JOIN IN ENDING NUCLEAR 
WEAPON TESTS. Statement made by Dean Rusk before 
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva on 
March 23, 1962. 
THE INITIATIVE FOR PEACE. Address made by William C. Fos-
ter before the School of Advanced International Studies 
of Johns Hopkins University at Washington, D.C., on 
May 4, 1962. 
THE NEW SEARCH FOR DISARMAMENT--Geneva 1962. Address 
made by Arthur H. Dean before the Swiss Friends of 
America at Zurich on May 10, 1962. 
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